Pak Sahafat – Analysts and senior Israeli soldiers consider 6 important factors to aggravate the scandalous failure of the Zionist regime in the Al-Aqsa storm operation.
According to the report of Pak Sahafat International News Agency, Al-Manar news channel in a report investigating the causes of the terrible failure of the Zionist regime army in the Al-Aqsa storm operation wrote that the Israeli army was surprised by a large and planned attack by the resistance groups, because no security and military intelligence had reported the occurrence of this storm, and because of this, the primary defense lines of the Zionist regime collapsed immediately, and the watch towers and military bases of the border areas collapsed.
Zionist analysts have pointed to 6 main factors for the aggravation of this failure and severe collapse and the spread of casualties and damages:
First failure: lack of intelligence
After the repeated heroic operations of the resistance forces in the West Bank and the continuation of daily conflicts in Nablus, Jenin and Hebron; The Zionist army decided to transfer three of its military battalions from the border areas of Gaza to the West Bank. This action was taken after intelligence evaluations showed that Hamas has no motivation and intention to fight and is not ready to enter the war at this time, which is considered an intelligence failure for the US and the Zionist regime.
Read more:
The second failure: confusing the Zionist military and intelligence services
The Israeli army and its intelligence services did not have a proper understanding of the volume and dimensions of the incidents and the events that had taken place for several hours, and after the release of some video clips on the virtual network that talked about the transfer of Zionist prisoners into the Gaza Strip, high number of Israeli casualties in this attack informed them of the depth of the disaster. Zionist analysts also reported that the Israeli army did not realize this attack until a few hours after the resistance forces attacked by sea and until the pictures and clips of this attack were published by the al-Qassam battalions.
The third failure: lack of sufficient forces in the region
The rapid collapse of the Zionist regime’s defense establishment from the very beginning of the attack destroyed the army’s ability to respond to the pleas of the Zionist settlers, and thus there was no one to save the settlers from their fate.
The fourth failure: lack of speed in preparation and transfer of forces
Although thousands of reserve and military forces of the Zionist regime were stationed in the region, the Israeli army was not prepared for such an incident, although the army had sent its special units to determine the location of Palestinian fighters in the south of the occupied territories, but the process of transferring the forces was very weak and even though the forces had reached their assembly points, but they were delayed for several hours to be transferred to the border points and areas close to the operation, this gave the resistance forces enough time to carry out their mission in killing the soldiers and settlers and capturing them and strengthening their positions to confront the army forces.
The fifth failure: long wait for power transfer
The suspension of the special forces of the Zionist regime took place when the army commanders knew that Hamas fighters had taken control of the Zionist settlements.
Sixth failure: information failure
Senior officials of the security services of the Zionist regime announced during the security meeting last week that Hamas is not ready for war and has not included war in its work plan. Six days before the attack, Zahi Hangbi, head of the Zionist Internal Security Council, confidently said that the activities of Hamas were completely under control. In a conversation with the Zionist Army Radio, he announced: “Peace reigns supreme, but assessing the duration of this peace is a difficult task, of course Hamas understands the situation.”