Al-Aqsa storm and Vahdat Meyedin; The performance balance of the resistance against Israel.
After the Quds Sword War in May 2021 and during the series of meetings of senior political officials and commanders of resistance groups, the operationalization of the strategic policy of “Unity of the Square” was put on the agenda.
According to this new policy, if any of the resistance member groups enter a level of tension with the enemies, strategic decisions will come out of the “joint command room” meetings and the decisions made in these meetings. The surprise operation of the Al-Aqsa storm on the 7th of October 2023 provided a good opportunity to evaluate the possibility of implementing the “unity of the fields” strategy based on the “internal” requirements of each of the member groups of the resistance axis in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. In the continuation of this note, we will try to examine the level of “efficiency” and “operationalization” of the unity strategy between the fields during the Gaza war.
Landing on the northern front
In the first hours of the Al-Aqsa storm operation, the Zionist army called for 300,000 reserve forces and called for the mobilization of all its military power to encircle and begin extensive operations in the Gaza Strip. Tel Aviv’s move towards the start of a large-scale operation in the dense Gaza area caused the Islamic resistance of Lebanon, according to the strategic policy of “Unification of the Fields”, to carry out targeted and targeted attacks against armored vehicles, radar-intelligence stations, and Zionist forces in the occupied fields of Shebaa, Kiryat Shmouneh, and Dofif settlements. , Yarin, Al-Bostan, Shlomi, Yaron region, Rahab, Al-Dahira, Al-Shahira, Yftah Qaddish, Al-Asi, Doviyo, Al-Motla, Al-Rahab, Jal-ul-Laam and Al-Abad bases.
After the Quds Sword War in May 2021 and during the series of meetings of senior political officials and commanders of resistance groups, the operationalization of the strategic policy of “Unity of the Square” was put on the agenda.
According to this new policy, if any of the resistance member groups enter a level of tension with the enemies, strategic decisions will come out of the “joint command room” meetings and the decisions made in these meetings. The surprise operation of the Al-Aqsa storm on the 7th of October 2023 provided a good opportunity to evaluate the possibility of implementing the “unity of the fields” strategy based on the “internal” requirements of each of the member groups of the resistance axis in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. In the continuation of this note, we will try to examine the level of “efficiency” and “operationalization” of the unity strategy between the fields during the Gaza war.
In the first hours of the Al-Aqsa storm operation, the Zionist army called for 300,000 reserve forces and called for the mobilization of all its military power to encircle and begin extensive operations in the Gaza Strip. Tel Aviv’s move towards the start of a large-scale operation in the dense Gaza area caused the Islamic resistance of Lebanon, according to the strategic policy of “Unification of the Fields”, to carry out targeted and targeted attacks against armored vehicles, radar-intelligence stations, and Zionist forces in the occupied fields of Shebaa, Kiryat Shmouneh, and Dofif settlements. , Yarin, Al-Bostan, Shlomi, Yaron region, Rahab, Al-Dahira, Al-Shahira, Yftah Qaddish, Al-Asi, Doviyo, Al-Motla, Al-Rahab, Jal-ul-Laam and Al-Abad bases.
On the opposite side, the Israeli army targeted military-civilian targets in southern Lebanon in addition to Hezbollah forces, killing journalists and even ordinary citizens.
Despite the continuation of the conflicts since October 8, Hizbollah has been able to ground almost half of the military talent of the Israeli air, sea, and ground forces in the north of occupied Palestine by adopting a “pragmatic” and “intelligent” policy. In addition, in order to prevent a repeat of the “7th of October” intelligence failure, with the permission of the National Emergency Cabinet, Tel Aviv has issued permission for the forced migration of nearly 70,000 Zionists from 43 Zionist settlements.