PNN – The assassination of Abu Ali Tabatabaei is not an ordinary event in the cycle of tensions in Lebanon. This act symbolizes the beginning of a phase in which the Zionist regime’s aggression has become more organized.
The assassination of Hezbollah’s senior military commander, Haitham Ali Tabatabaei, in Beirut’s Haret Harik neighborhood is one of the most important and decisive security events in recent years in Lebanon; an event that not only has military dimensions but also political, regional, and international consequences that could change the structure of deterrence equations in Lebanon. The re-entry of the Israeli regime into the heart of the southern suburbs, an area that has been known for decades as Hezbollah’s most important security zone, indicates that Tel Aviv has effectively decided to once again shift the conflict from the peripheral to the central level.
This attack, with its high precision, use of guided weapons, and choice of sensitive time and place, has been interpreted by many Lebanese and regional analysts as the “beginning of a new phase”; a phase in which neither the 2024 ceasefire has real meaning nor the red lines of the past remain intact.
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Attack design and conflict phase change message
The attack on Sunday on a residential building in Haret Harik was carried out using precision-guided missiles. The Lebanese Ministry of Health announced that five people were killed and 28 were injured. Lebanese security sources also confirmed that Haitham Tabatabaei was the main target of the operation and was directly hit. For years, the Zionist regime has introduced him as Hezbollah’s second-in-command and the undisputed commander of the organization’s military structure; someone who played a key role in the architecture of the Radwan forces, the management of the 2006 war, and the expansion of Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities.
The important point in this operation is the “return of the Zionist regime to the southern suburbs.” In recent months, most attacks have been limited to the south and the Bekaa, and Tel Aviv has refrained from entering central Beirut. Now, however, entering directly into the depths of the suburb sends a clear message: the Zionist regime is no longer only no longer respecting the lines of the past, but is actually trying to shift the battlefield to Hezbollah’s center of gravity. This trend can be seen in the series of assassinations of the past few years, from Fuad Shaker and Ibrahim Aqeel to the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. A series of targeted operations that show that Tel Aviv is pursuing a systematic project to destroy the top of the resistance’s command pyramid.
Fake ceasefire and the Zionist regime’s use of post-war opportunities
The ceasefire that was established in Lebanon after the 2024 war was never a real ceasefire. The Zionist regime violated it every day: Drone strikes, artillery, and limited but continuous infiltrations. However, the severity of these violations was such that it did not pass the level of widespread media coverage. Now, with the details of Sunday’s operation becoming clear, it has become clear that the Zionist regime has used the “ceasefire” period to consolidate two goals:
- Accurately identifying the location of resistance commanders.
- Reducing the level of security and protection for commanders by creating a sense of relative peace.
In fact, the ceasefire was an information opportunity for the Zionist regime, not a period of calm, and the Tabatabaei assassination operation is a direct result of this process.
Lebanese and regional analysts have emphasized that carrying out such a precise operation would be almost impossible without American coordination. The United States has been in complete control of the lines of contact in recent months and has been responsible for regulating the ceasefire process and containing tensions between Lebanon and the Israeli regime. At the same time, Washington is pursuing a policy of multi-layered pressure against Hezbollah. The silence of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and even the countries guaranteeing the ceasefire also sent a clear message: this operation is not just Tel Aviv’s decision; there is a regional-international political umbrella behind it.
The Hebrew-Western Axis and Breaking the Rules of Deterrence
The Zionist regime entered a phase of “maximum risk-taking” on October 7th, a phase in which it did not keep the war confined to Gaza but extended it to Lebanon, Yemen, and even Iran. Although it faced defeat and heavy costs on some of these fronts, especially in the 12-day war with Iran, its behavioral pattern did not change. Tel Aviv still believes that assassinating resistance commanders can prevent a full-scale war and impose deterrence on Hezbollah by creating “organizational terror.”
The Lebanese government: Inefficient structure and crisis of political will
In the face of this wave of aggression, the Lebanese government has appeared almost paralyzed. The fragmented political structure, the dependence of a large part of the internal currents on foreign support, and the conflicting interests of the groups have resulted in no consensus for a response. The government has neither the ability to take practical action nor the will to adopt clear positions. Not even minimal diplomatic measures have been taken.
The life, role and position of Haitham Tabatabaei in the structure of the resistance
Haitham Ali Tabatabaei, known as Abu Ali, was born in southern Lebanon in 1968 and was considered a second generation Hezbollah commander. Unlike Hezbollah’s founding generation, who operated in the early 1980s in the organization’s formative years, Tabatabaei entered a more cohesive and defined organization.
He joined Hezbollah as a young man and played a role in the southern battle axes during the wars of the 1990s. In 1996, he became commander of the Nabatiyeh axis, a position he held until the liberation of the south in 2000. Later, he assumed command of operations in the Al-Khayyam axis and led several important operational axes in the 2006 war. Field reports show that Tabatabaei was one of the main resistance leaders in offensive operations and against the Zionist regime’s influence in this war.
In recent years, after the martyrdom of several prominent commanders, his status has been further enhanced, and after the martyrdom of Fuad Shakar, he was practically known as Hezbollah’s first military commander. The Zionist regime had targeted him several times in Syria and Lebanon, but all these attempts had failed until, in November 1404, Tel Aviv carried out a successful operation against him in the southern suburbs.
The strategic implications of this assassination for Lebanon’s future
The assassination of Tabatabaei is part of a larger plan to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military power and weaken its command structure. The Zionist regime believes that by disrupting the command network and eliminating key figures, it can challenge the resistance in a possible future war. But experience has shown that Hezbollah has a networked, multi-layered structure and has the ability to quickly replace commanders.
If Hezbollah responds heavily, the possibility of a wider war increases. If it responds only partially, the Zionist regime will continue its targeted assassinations. Hezbollah is therefore now faced with a strategic choice, and this situation raises the possibility of redefining the rules of deterrence more seriously than before.
Conclusion
The assassination of Abu Ali Tabatabaei is not an ordinary event in the cycle of Lebanese tensions. This act symbolizes the beginning of a phase in which ceasefires have become meaningless, the Zionist regime’s aggression has become more structured, and the Western-Jewish axis has entered a new level of risk-taking. America’s support, the silence of the countries guaranteeing the ceasefire, the inability of the Lebanese government, and internal pressures against the resistance have all created conditions that face Hezbollah with difficult choices.