PNN – Contrary to the media atmosphere created about disarming the resistance in Lebanon, it appears that Hezbollah has chosen a strategy of “rebuilding” rather than “restoring deterrence” in the short term.
The extensive efforts of the United States and the Zionist regime to disarm Hezbollah have reached an obvious deadlock. This deadlock not only stems from the steadfast resistance of Lebanon’s resistance, but also from the hesitation of Lebanese institutions in implementing Resolution 1701 and Western political-financial pressures. The Trump administration, in full coordination with Tel Aviv, uses sanctions, military threats, and diplomatic pressure to force Lebanon to surrender, but so far this strategy has only intensified Lebanon’s internal crisis and significantly increased the risk of another outbreak of war.
However, the cancellation of the Lebanese army commander’s trip to Washington, coinciding with Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the U.S., indicates the peak of the gap and disagreement between the Lebanese government and Western actors regarding the disarmament of the resistance and Lebanon’s march toward the brink of civil war. In the following, this note will attempt to answer why the “Hezbollah disarmament” project has encountered a “deadlock.”
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Reasons for the cancellation of Haikal’s trip to Washington
Informed sources in Lebanon have unveiled the hidden dimensions of the canceled trip of Army Commander General Rudolf Haikal to Washington; an event which, contrary to the initial perception, is not limited only to his recent statement about the violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty by the Zionist regime, but is understandable within a broader framework of escalating tension between Haikal and the U.S. political-security delegation. According to these sources, the main root of the tension goes back to the cold relationship between the army commander and Morgan Ortagus, the new U.S. envoy to Beirut. This coldness was intensified by behind-the-scenes provocations by Ortagus against Haikal among some Lebanese politicians.
He claimed that the army commander “does not implement U.S. demands in containing Hezbollah.” This dissatisfaction intensified after Haikal’s recent cabinet meeting, where he presented a detailed report, speaking of “repeated security and political insults against the army” and warning that his forces in the south are “under direct pressure and attack by the Zionist regime.” Haikal even mentioned the option of suspending all army activities in southern Litani due to “Israeli obstacles and harassment.” These remarks quickly reached the Americans through intermediaries and influential figures inside the government, creating a new wave of dissatisfaction.
In Washington, the main grievance against the army commander is not due to his recent statement, but because of his stand against direct U.S. and Zionist demands; demands including entering the homes of southern citizens to search for and collect Hezbollah weapons. Haikal described this demand as “dangerous, destabilizing internally, and futile,” warning that “fulfilling this demand is only the beginning, and Israel will make further demands from Lebanon each time.” Accordingly, the cancellation of this trip is considered a political message; Washington expected the army commander to adopt a more aggressive approach against Hezbollah, but Haikal, insisting on the army’s limits and protecting internal stability, chose a different path.
Is the second phase of the Third Lebanon War near?
The Zionist regime’s threat to expand the war constitutes the fourth corner of this deadly deadlock. Israeli officials, including Israel Katz, Minister of Defense, have repeatedly stated that if Hezbollah is not disarmed, extensive operations against its leadership, arms depots, and resistance infrastructure across Lebanon will be launched. The Israeli army, facing a shortage of 12,000 active personnel, focuses on heavy air strikes and targeted assassinations instead of a broad ground invasion. At the same time, the Zionist lobby in Washington encourages the U.S. government to unconditionally support any new military action. These threats, however, have reinforced, rather than weakened, Lebanese society’s cohesion in support of the resistance.
Developments after the “Third Lebanon War” have shifted the field from direct military confrontation to a war of attrition economically and in governance, placing Lebanon at the center of a zero-sum game. In this new strategy, the U.S. and Israel, instead of focusing exclusively on Hezbollah’s military capability, target Lebanon’s entire governmental and economic structure to exert indirect pressure on the group.
Targeted U.S. financial pressure on institutions such as the “Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association” and Israel’s military-economic threats against vital infrastructure, such as Beirut Airport, are two sides of a scissor whose goal is to increase the political and economic cost of Hezbollah’s activities for the entire country. The logic of this approach is to create an unbearable dilemma for the Lebanese government: either by restricting Hezbollah’s financial and logistical arteries, it risks an internal crisis, or through inaction, witnesses the country’s economic collapse and complete isolation. Thus, Lebanon’s governance and economy have become not collateral damage but the battlefield itself and a main tool for curbing Hezbollah’s influence.
Parallel efforts to cut Hezbollah’s financial arteries
The intention to cut Hezbollah’s financial channels has increased intelligence actions against elements associated with the group inside and outside Lebanon. For example, the “Alma” educational-research center affiliated with “Shin Bet,” in a piece titled “Hezbollah-Linked Exchange Houses in Beirut,” wrote that since January 2025, Iran’s IRGC Quds Force has successfully transferred $1 billion to Hezbollah for post-war reconstruction, primarily through exchange companies.
This round of funding by the IRGC Quds Force was disclosed by the U.S. Treasury Department in its announcement of sanctions against key Lebanese individuals “who in 2025 transferred tens of millions of dollars from Iran to Hezbollah and used exchange houses to exploit Lebanon’s cash-based financial sector” – Office of Foreign Assets Control. In July 2025, a special report detailed Hezbollah’s misuse of exchange companies to launder illegal funds for infrastructure, weapons, and other terrorist activities threatening regional stability and weakening the Lebanese government.
For example, on June 24, 2025, Haitham Abdullah Bakri, director of the “Al-Sadiq” exchange, was killed in a targeted Israeli airstrike. Bakri was a central figure in Hezbollah’s financial network. The Al-Sadiq office is one of six Lebanese exchange houses forming a key part of Hezbollah’s terrorism financing mechanism; the others are: Maktab, Yara, Al-Insaf, Malihah, Hasan Ayash. Through these centers, funds from Iranian sources, global donations, and international criminal activities are transferred to Hezbollah. Their activities are legally masked through Lebanese licenses and the lack of enforcement.
Recently, the American “Foundation for Defense of Democracies” accused Hezbollah of funding part of its operations through organized crime. The text claims Hezbollah’s involvement in drug trafficking has deep roots in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley during the 1970s and 1980s; this activity initially grew due to Syrian control over drug cultivation in the region and the destruction of other economic sectors during Lebanon’s civil war, gradually enabling Hezbollah to become a tool beyond mere income generation. The text continues that the group uses existing smuggling networks along the Lebanon-Israel border to pursue operational objectives. These include exchanging drugs for information from Arab-Israeli criminals and even transferring explosives and weapons through these channels. Levit refers to cases such as the kidnapping of Hanan Tannenbaum and the espionage of Colonel Omar Hayb to show how the line between criminal activities and security-military operations has blurred for Hezbollah, and how the group exploits smuggling as a strategic lever.
Conclusion
Contrary to the media narrative regarding the disarmament of Lebanon’s resistance, it appears that under the leadership of Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah has chosen a short-term “rebuilding” strategy rather than “restoring deterrence,” in order to prepare the ground for countering Zionist enemy actions in the long term. Repeating the epic expulsion of occupying forces in 2000 requires rebuilding Hezbollah’s combat units and covering weaknesses that in the recent war allowed a shift in the balance in the Arab East region.
Accordingly, for now, the U.S. and Israel’s demand for Hezbollah’s disarmament faces an uncertain future, and it is possible that Netanyahu, to avoid another defeat on the Lebxanon front, may choose the option of a full-scale war. A potential future war will show to what extent Hezbollah possesses the flexibility necessary to counter the regime’s terrorist actions and repel the enemy from Lebanese territory.