PNN – The possibility of a large-scale regional war is low. Despite the slogans that are reflected by the extremists, the reality of Iran’s strategic thinking is more considerate. There are at least seven reasons why Tehran is likely to avoid starting a war with Israel on behalf of Hamas.
First, probably the Islamic Republic of Iran will not be able to mobilize the public to engage in a new war like it did with Iraq in the 1980s. Along with other factors, it was the relentless human mobilization that led to resistance against the Iraqi army and forced Baghdad to withdraw from Iran. However, decades later, support for the new war has declined significantly. This is despite the fact that after last year’s protests, the economic crisis, which was partially caused by the US sanctions, has intensified and dissatisfaction among the youth and urban middle class has increased.
Second, Iran’s moderate faction has warned against Iran’s direct intervention in the war. In fact, the war in Gaza has deepened some political differences in Tehran. In the extremists’ assessment of the threat, the destruction of Hamas automatically means the subsequent collapse of Hezbollah and ultimately a military attack on Iran. This point of view is completely opposite to the point of view of Iran’s senior officials
Third, Israel’s apparent failure to prevent Hamas’ attack on October 7 does not change Tehran’s strategic calculations towards Israel. Despite Israel’s reliance on advanced defense technologies such as the Iron Dome missile defense system, Hamas dealt a significant military and intelligence blow to it, thereby breaking Israel’s deterrence policy. But this does not change Iran’s view of Israel or the power dynamics in the region. Although the Hamas operation affected Israel’s long-established deterrence strategy, it does not provide an opening for Iran to challenge Israel with its missile power. Conversely, Iran may believe that Israel feels that re-establishing deterrence is an existential priority worth taking extraordinary military or political risks for.
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Fourth, contrary to conventional belief, neither Hamas nor even Hezbollah is Iran’s proxy force. It is more correct to consider them as Iran’s non-state allies. There is no top-down relationship between Tehran and Hamas. Even as Hamas aligns its actions with Iran, their approaches may diverge, for example during the Syrian civil war Hamas supported anti-Assad Sunni rebels. American and Israeli intelligence agencies have also said that Iran’s senior officials did not know about Hamas operations.
Fifth, Iran’s strategic partners in Moscow and Beijing have not declared their full support for Hamas. Based on its look-to-the-east policy, Iran seeks alignment with China and Russia and hates to disrupt its relations with these countries. Tehran is actually following a similar policy in Gaza that China and Russia adopted two years ago after observing the wait-and-see approach during the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban. Iran’s goal is to avoid isolation in major international crises.
Sixth, there is a deep belief among influential decision-makers in Iran that the Persian Gulf Arab sheikhdoms would welcome a full-scale war between Iran and Israel. Iran may hope that Arab countries will cut ties with Israel as a result of a wider war, but this is unlikely. Arab public opinion has little influence on the foreign policy of their countries. And Arab leaders have long viewed Hamas as Iran’s disruptive proxy and would be happy to see Israel destroy it once and for all.
The last and most important factor affecting Iran’s apparent unwillingness to go to war is the specific view of the high officials towards regional conflicts. Contrary to the mainstream view in the West, Iranian top decision-makers see the response to regional conflicts from a realistic perspective and not an ideological one. After a devastating war with Iraq, Tehran is acutely aware of the consequences of war, especially with the United States, and this awareness led Iran to choose a relatively measured response to the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, the late commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, by the United States. Such behavior is in line with Tehran’s overall strategy in managing regional crises. More than two decades ago, when Iranian diplomats were killed in northern Afghanistan by the Taliban’s first emirate and public sentiment in Iran tilted heavily toward a major conflict, senior officials scrambled to prevent an escalation.
These seven interrelated reasons explain the reluctance of the Islamic Republic to engage in the war on behalf of Hamas. However, the Gaza war may accelerate Iran’s nuclear program. There are strong voices in Iran, mainly in the hardline camp, who argue that the country’s most important tool for preventing the destruction of Hamas rests on its decision to fully pursue nuclear capabilities. They believe that Iran’s trump card lies in threatening to denuclearize and showing vital support to its allies – similar to its previous support for the Assad government in Syria. This argument gained considerable momentum when Amichai Eliyahu, Israel’s extreme cultural heritage minister, defended dropping “some kind of nuclear bomb” on the Gaza Strip “to kill everyone” as “an option.”