PNN – The current crisis in Sudan is no longer just a civil war; it reflects the historical collapse of the country’s political, social, and economic structures.
Sudan’s civil war, which began in April 2023, has become one of the most severe humanitarian crises of the 21st century. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), are the main parties to the conflict. According to the United Nations, more than 14 million people have been displaced—marking the largest population displacement in the world.
The fall of al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, to the RSF on October 26, 2025, after an 18-month siege, was not only a major military victory for Hemedti but also a sign of a possible fragmentation of Sudan into separate autonomous regions. As SAF forces retreated, the frontlines reshaped, placing Sudan at a crossroads: either toward stabilization or deeper escalation of the crisis. To understand the scale of this collapse, it is essential to explore Sudan’s historical, social, and economic roots—not just the ongoing battles.
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Historical Roots of Sudan’s Crisis
Sudan has long been one of Africa’s most complex states, with political and social structures shaped by both pre-colonial legacies and colonial interventions. The 1821 invasion by Muhammad Ali Pasha dismantled local kingdoms such as the Funj and Sennar and laid the foundation for a centralized state. The Mahdist period (1885–1899) attempted to create indigenous governance but collapsed after the death of Muhammad Ahmad. British-Egyptian rule (1899–1956) reinforced divisions through its “closed districts” policy, separating the Arab-Islamic north from the Christian-African south—a divide that later fueled ethnic conflict.
After independence in 1956, Sudan entered a cycle of coups and instability. Civil wars in the south (1955–1972 and 1983–2005) culminated in South Sudan’s secession in 2011, causing Khartoum to lose 75% of its oil resources. The Darfur war (2003) and conflicts in Kordofan and Blue Nile (2011–2020) further empowered marginalized regions. The concentration of power and resources in Khartoum and Gezira created a persistent center-periphery divide, turning peripheral regions into hubs of rebellion.
The Fall of al-Fashir and the Prospect of Partition
With the RSF’s capture of al-Fashir, nearly 25% of Sudan’s territory—Darfur—came under its control. The victory was accompanied by widespread civilian massacres and was facilitated by SAF’s focus on defending Khartoum and other central regions. Despite SAF’s recapture of Khartoum in March 2025, its concentration of forces in the capital opened the way for the RSF to consolidate its hold over Darfur through tribal militias, external supply routes, and gold revenues from Jebel Amer.
The RSF’s rise has two significant implications: it has evolved into a parallel governing entity with plans to form a “Peace and Unity Government,” issue currency, and establish civil registries; and at the same time, its campaign in Darfur has intensified atrocities and ethnic cleansing, displacing around 50,000 people and altering the demographic balance.
Sudan’s economy has suffered severe damage: war losses are estimated at $200 billion, industrial production has fallen by 70%, services by 49%, and agriculture by 21%. More than 8 million people are internally displaced, over 2 million have fled abroad, and thousands have been killed.
Structural Drivers of the Conflict
Sudan, with a population of 45 million, holds vast natural and agricultural resources—gold, silver, chromium, platinum, oil, gas, 84 million hectares of arable land, and large livestock reserves. Yet resource concentration in the center has marginalized peripheral regions, feeding cycles of violence. The RSF has leveraged tribal militias in Darfur to build significant economic and military power.
At the start of the war, the RSF seized key parts of Khartoum, but SAF eventually reclaimed the capital using air superiority. The RSF then shifted to a strategy of siege and expansion in Darfur with the help of foreign backers. The conflict clearly reflects the center-periphery divide: SAF prioritizes defending strategic central regions, while the RSF mobilizes marginalized areas to weaken the center.
Future Scenarios
Recent developments suggest that the battle for Kordofan will be a decisive turning point. Both sides view the region as critical but for different reasons. For SAF, Kordofan is the final defensive shield protecting Khartoum. Losing it could shift the entire balance of power in Hemedti’s favor. SAF therefore plans to intensify troop deployments and rely heavily on air power to hold the area.
For the RSF, Kordofan represents an opportunity to consolidate control over western Sudan and expand influence beyond Darfur. A victory there could enable Hemedti to push deeper into the country.
Scenario 1: SAF holds Kordofan
The most likely scenario is that SAF maintains control of Kordofan. Despite its gains in Darfur, the RSF lacks the logistical capacity for a prolonged siege of al-Obeid, the regional capital. The open terrain, long supply routes, and vulnerability to airstrikes limit RSF advancement. SAF’s access to airbases and secure communications strengthens its position. Under this scenario, frontlines would stabilize, similar to eastern Libya under Khalifa Haftar: an informal division of power with parallel authorities.
Scenario 2: RSF advances in Kordofan
A full RSF takeover of Kordofan is unlikely. Such an operation would require massive troop deployments and risk leaving Darfur exposed. If Hemedti attempts it, SAF would commit all available forces to prevent losing the gateway to the Nile Valley and Khartoum.
Scenario 3: SAF retakes Darfur
This scenario is the least likely. SAF lacks the manpower, logistical capacity, and supply routes to reclaim Darfur in the near term. The army will likely prioritize defending Kordofan and use it as a staging ground for future operations.
Overall, Sudan is moving toward a military stalemate. SAF retains control of the capital and strategic centers, while the RSF has entrenched itself in the west with solid tribal and geographic support. Without structural political reforms and real decentralization of power, Sudan risks sliding into a Libyan-style de facto partition with two competing military authorities.
Conclusion
Sudan’s crisis represents the breakdown of its historical political order. Deep-rooted discrimination, centralized governance, and decades of marginalization paved the way for forces like the RSF to emerge as quasi-state actors. The fall of Darfur and the looming battle for Kordofan place Sudan on a path toward “Libyan-style fragmentation”—a divided state with parallel governments backed by competing regional powers.