Iran, Russia and China must work together to develop a range of deterrent options—spanning diplomacy to defensive measures—to counter the United States and Israel.
Intensifying hostile actions by the U.S. and Europe have tightened political, economic and cultural pressures on Iran, naturally pushing Tehran toward strengthening bilateral and regional partnerships, especially with Russia and China. At the same time, rival and adversarial actors—including the U.S., the U.K., Turkey and Israel—are expanding their political, security and intelligence footprint in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This means that if Tehran and Moscow want to curb the influence of these external actors, they must cooperate in several concrete and operational areas.
A number of overlooked developments in the Caucasus and Central Asia show that this region is rapidly becoming a highly challenging arena for Iran and Russia—and subsequently China. Last week, Brianna Todd, a member of the Atlantic Council and an associate of the U.S. Department of Defense, told an audience—including Turkey’s ambassador to the U.S.—that Armenia and Tajikistan are the “missing elements” of the Organization of Turkic States. She called for both countries to join the organization under Ankara’s leadership. Todd added that she agrees with the view that the South Caucasus and Central Asia should be seen as a single unit, with Armenia and Tajikistan completing the Turkic bloc.
Another notable development last week that reveals Turkey’s long-term ambitions was the first foreign trip of the newly appointed mufti of Istanbul province, Emrullah Tuncel. Immediately after receiving his appointment from President Erdoğan, he traveled not to Mecca, Medina, Cairo or even Palestine, but to the Turkic autonomous republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the Russian Federation. In the Bashkir capital, he attended the international conference “Ideas and Values of Islam: One Ummah – One Destiny,” stating: “The duty of clerics is to call for obedience to God’s commands and to promote living in peace and friendship with followers of different religions and ethnicities. There is a special bridge of friendship between Istanbul and Ufa. The Islamic University in Bashkortostan’s capital, whose construction we began in 2015 and opened in 2022, is a symbol of unity between our nations.”
These remarks make clear that the “special bridge of friendship” between Istanbul and Turkic regions of Russia is part of Erdoğan’s ethnic-religious strategy to complete his neo-Ottoman project within Russian territory. Tuncel’s visit highlights where Turkey’s real priorities lie. Ankara plainly sees the Turkic republics of the Volga region as areas of special spiritual interest.
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It is clear that Turkey has long been pursuing a deliberate strategy to weaken Russia from within, using soft-power tools rooted in pan-Turkism and radical Brotherhood-style narratives to influence Turkic populations.
In another development, a major data center is being built in Armenia to meet the intelligence needs of the United States. Such a facility would enable large-scale processing of intercepted data from across the region. Its location in Armenia will give Washington massive computational capabilities not only in the South Caucasus but also across the Middle East.
Meanwhile, the West has begun treating the Aliyev government as part of Central Asia, shifting the “C5+1” negotiation format to a “C6+1” structure (five Central Asian states plus Azerbaijan and the U.S.). As Baku continues its provocative actions against Moscow, Russia has been forced to respond. Turkey and Azerbaijan’s support for jihadist and Wahhabi militants in the Caucasus and Central Asia, U.S. attempts to destabilize Georgia, efforts to expand the Abraham Accords into the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Ankara’s alignment with U.S. and NATO interests in the region all show that traditional approaches are no longer sufficient. Iran, Russia and China must develop a shared assessment of these threats and stand together against them.
Below are practical areas and recommendations—in order of priority—designed to counter U.S., British and Israeli influence in the region:
Military and Security Cooperation
- Expand cross-border security, military and intelligence cooperation, including intelligence sharing on the activities of third-party actors in the Caucasus and on the creation of transit routes such as the so-called “Trump Corridor.”
- Conduct joint naval and air exercises and train for responses to asymmetric threats—terrorism, sabotage and cyberattacks—focusing on the protection of transport routes and critical infrastructure in the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus.
- Establish a joint center for monitoring news and events and countering information-warfare and infiltration operations, especially in local media and social networks in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Israel closely cooperate in this field.
- Collaborate to strengthen cybersecurity and digital infrastructure, including customs, ports and transportation systems.
These measures are vital for controlling narratives and preventing regional rivals—Turkey, Israel and the West—from shaping political influence.
Transit and Corridor Development
- Build shared transportation routes to reduce reliance on corridors controlled by third parties. This includes strengthening rail networks linking Iran–Azerbaijan–Russia and Iran–Armenia–Georgia–Russia, or creating alternative shipping routes in the Caspian Sea. Cooperation with Russia on establishing the Aras Corridor—which links Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Iran—would be beneficial as it undermines the “Trump Corridor.”
- Implement joint logistics and transit projects that integrate local economies along the Tehran–Moscow–Central Asia axis. Strengthening rail connections through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is especially important for reducing U.S. and Turkish influence in the region.
Energy Cooperation
Iran and Russia should deepen cooperation on regional energy security, including:
- Joint development of electricity production and transmission projects, gas and power lines, and energy storage systems connecting the Caucasus and Central Asia to Iranian and Russian networks.
- Joint investment in renewable energy projects to reduce strategic dependence on external suppliers. Iran’s electricity-for-gas exchange with Armenia is one example; enabling Russian gas transit to Iran through Georgia and Armenia—as an alternative to Azerbaijan—would also be useful.
Economic and Financial Coordination
Enhanced financial coordination is critical for mitigating sanctions:
- Launch or expand bilateral payment mechanisms, barter systems and the use of national currencies or alternative payment networks to support regional trade.
- Establish joint credit lines and a regional development fund for infrastructure projects in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
Sanctions and snapback mechanisms are tools of economic pressure; alternative financial channels ensure continuity of projects and economic integration. Capacities within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can also be utilized.
Strengthening Diplomatic Coordination
- Align Iranian, Russian and Chinese political initiatives to promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes—such as between Armenia and Azerbaijan—backed by economic incentives for local actors.
- Use regional organizations—such as ECO or the Eurasian Economic Union where applicable—to legitimize and strengthen Iran and Russia’s regional presence. Active engagement in conflict resolution prevents outside powers, especially the U.S., from positioning themselves as mediators or security guarantors.
Cultural Initiatives
Joint investment in social and cultural programs in the Caucasus is essential:
- Offer shared scholarships, establish joint educational institutions, create regional media outlets and develop cultural projects that counter foreign influence and build deeper societal ties with populations of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
These measures will strengthen Iran and Russia’s grassroots and elite-level presence while reducing ideological and political influence from external rivals.
Special Focus on the Caspian Sea
Iran and Russia must jointly shape the rules and strategic environment of the Caspian Sea, including:
- Coordinating regulations for resource extraction, protecting Caspian Sea security, preventing long-term foreign military or commercial presence in key ports, and revising the Caspian legal regime to prohibit undersea oil and gas pipelines.
The Caspian is a strategic body of water, and any external military or economic footprint would fundamentally alter regional power dynamics.
Ultimately, Iran, Russia and China must cooperate closely to develop a broad, diversified set of deterrent tools—from diplomacy to defense—to counter the United States and Israel.