PNN – The crisis in Sudan is the result of decades of rivalry between the army and militias, suppression of civil movements, and neglect of ethnic justice. Lasting peace in Sudan will only be possible when all parties return to genuine national dialogue.
Sudan, a country with a turbulent history from colonial times to the 2019 revolution, is now engulfed in a deep and complex crisis. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has split the nation into two opposing military camps, leading to the collapse of its social and political order. But the roots of the crisis go far beyond a mere power struggle between two commanders; beneath this conflict lies a network of diverse domestic actors, each tied to ethnicity, ideology, economics, and Sudan’s long history of structural inequality.
From the army and paramilitary forces to rebel groups, Islamists, civil organizations, and local tribes, every actor plays a role in this multidimensional crisis. As a result, more than 11 million people have been displaced, and the threat of famine and total state collapse looms larger than ever. The recent massacre and humanitarian catastrophe in the city of El-Fasher by RSF forces have once again drawn global attention to Sudan. But which domestic groups are active in this conflict?
The Sudanese Armed Forces: The traditional guardian of the state
Led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the Sudanese army is a legacy of the Anglo-Egyptian colonial military structure of the early 20th century. Since independence in 1956, it has served as the backbone of the central government, orchestrating nearly all military regimes and coups. The army played a decisive role in the 2019 revolution—initially allying with civilian forces to remove Omar al-Bashir, but soon joining with the RSF to suppress the democratic transition and retain power.
The army’s primary goals in the current crisis are to preserve its monopoly on political and military authority, absorb the RSF into its structure, and restore a controlled version of the transition process. With roughly 130,000 troops, it controls the north and east of the country but has less influence in Darfur and the capital. Its main supporters include Islamists linked to the former al-Bashir regime and tribes in eastern Sudan. From the army’s perspective, the RSF are “illegal rebels,” and restoring central authority is the only path to ending the conflict.
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Why are Darfur and the city of Fasher in western Sudan of strategic importance?
The Rapid Support Forces: From Janjaweed to political power
The RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—better known as Hemedti—evolved from the Janjaweed militias of Darfur, notorious for their brutal role in suppressing ethnic uprisings in the early 2000s. Hemedti, who comes from a trading family in Darfur, transformed the group in 2013 into a formal, powerful paramilitary force.
In the current crisis, his goals include maintaining military independence, securing equal political power, and controlling the country’s gold mines, which serve as the RSF’s main financial base. The RSF, with about 100,000 fighters—mostly from Arab tribes in Darfur—controls parts of the capital, Darfur, and Kordofan. Despite widespread accusations of war crimes in El-Fasher and involvement in gold smuggling, the group reportedly enjoys financial and military support from some regional countries. While Hemedti publicly calls for participation in a future government, in practice, he seeks to replace the army and become Sudan’s dominant political force.
Darfur Rebel Groups: Ethnic justice and autonomy
Alongside the two main factions, Darfur’s rebel movements also play a key role. Groups like the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minni Minnawi and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Gibril Ibrahim trace their origins to the 2003 uprisings against ethnic discrimination and the concentration of power in Khartoum. These leaders briefly joined the transitional government after the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement but rejoined the army when the current war began, fighting against the RSF.
Their main objectives are ethnic justice, regional autonomy for Darfur, and meaningful participation in political power. They also demand justice for the victims of Darfur’s genocide and reconstruction of war-torn regions. On the battlefield, these groups control parts of northern Darfur and operate under the “Joint Darfur Forces” coalition allied with the army. However, internal divisions—such as those led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur—have prevented their full unity.
Islamists and Civil Forces: Two ideological poles
Sudan’s Islamists, rooted in Omar al-Bashir’s National Congress Party, lost influence after his 2019 downfall but have recently regained prominence alongside the army. Their goal is a return to an Islamic political system and opposition to secular and liberal movements. They see themselves as natural allies of the army in preserving the traditional power structure and seek the implementation of Sharia-based law in a future transitional government.
Conversely, the civil forces that led the 2019 revolution—such as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—represent the public’s demand for democracy and civilian rule. They call for free elections, separation of military and political power, and accountability for perpetrators of violence.
However, the civil movement itself is divided: the “Democratic Coalition” faction supports the army to prevent an RSF takeover, while others criticize both sides and advocate for an independent civilian government. Grassroots groups like the “Resistance Committees” and “Professionals Association,” born out of mass protests, remain socially influential voices of the people, even if their formal political power is limited.
Tribes and Local Militias: Ethnic loyalties
Sudan’s social fabric is composed of dozens of tribes and clans whose loyalties are shaped by ethnic, geographic, and historical ties. Tribes such as the Masalit in western Darfur and the Zaghawa in the north have long suffered from the central government’s discriminatory policies. Many now engage in the conflict either independently or through local militias—not necessarily to gain political power, but to defend their land, resources, and communities.
In contrast, most Arab tribes in Darfur support the RSF, as its leadership comes from among them. Yet internal tribal rivalries have made even temporary alliances fragile. In recent years, new groups like the “Sudan Shield Forces” have emerged to defend central and northern regions, sometimes allying with the army, sometimes acting independently. This fragmentation shows that Sudan’s conflict has gone beyond a two-sided war, becoming a multilayered struggle among ethnic and local actors.
Historical Roots: Power concentration and structural inequality
To understand the depth of the crisis, one must look at Sudan’s historical power structure. Since independence, political authority and economic resources have been concentrated in Khartoum and the northern regions, while peripheral areas such as Darfur, Kordofan, and eastern Sudan have been deprived of development, public services, and fair political representation.
This chronic inequality, coupled with ethnic and religious divisions, fostered rebellion, militia activity, and deep resentment. The current crisis is a continuation of this long-standing pattern—centralized power versus peripheral resistance. The military has always viewed itself as the guardian of national unity, treating civilian demands for fair power-sharing as threats to the nation’s cohesion.
Conclusion
Sudan’s current crisis stems from decades of rivalry between the army and militias, suppression of civil movements, and disregard for ethnic justice. Lasting peace will only be achievable if all parties—especially the army and RSF—return to genuine national dialogue and revive the Juba Peace Agreement as a foundation for political and social reconstruction. Otherwise, the ongoing cycle of violence, famine, and state collapse will turn Sudan into a perpetual battleground for domestic and foreign interests.