PNN – The use of online networks, financial incentives, and exploitation of social and psychological weaknesses are tools that Iran uses to expand its influence in Zionist society.
In recent years, tensions and shadow wars between Iran and Israel have increased significantly. These conflicts are not limited to direct military battles, but the field of intelligence and espionage has become one of the main arenas of competition. By utilizing complex and targeted strategies, Iran has been able to increase its influence in sensitive security and social layers of Israel and collect vital information through a network of domestic spies. What make Iran’s influence process remarkable is the internal weakness of Israeli society and the regime’s crisis of legitimacy. Analysis shows that many residents of the occupied territories do not believe in the future of the regime and its stability and feel that the political and social structure is collapsing. This distrust, along with economic problems, religious and ethnic differences, and pressures from ongoing conflicts with the Palestinians, has provided a suitable environment for infiltration and recruitment of spies.
Intelligence developments between Iran and Israel in recent years show that both sides are engaged in a complex and multi-layered covert war. In the 12-day summer war, Israel was able to demonstrate its influence networks in Iran; networks consisting of Iranian and non-Iranian agents who were used to gather information about nuclear facilities, the activities of scientists, and even the country’s defense structures. Some of these agents also played a role in the transfer of secret equipment and technology used in covert operations against Iran. After the war ended, Tehran launched a massive wave of arrests and purges aimed at identifying infiltrators. At the same time, however, Iran has also expanded its recruitment and influence campaign inside Israel. According to Israeli security reports, Iran’s efforts to recruit Israeli residents, often through cyberspace and with financial incentives, have accelerated since at least 2020. Based on recorded data, from 2013 to 2025, some 39 Iranian-related espionage or security cases were discovered inside Israel, 31 of which involved Israeli residents. Many of these forces had simpler tasks, such as taking pictures of military bases, monitoring army movements, or even putting up anti-regime posters; but since 2024, the missions have entered a more serious phase.
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Iran’s strategy of influence in Israel
Iranian influence in Israel has been going on for years, but its serious trend has intensified since the early 2020s. Data-driven analysis shows that Iran uses digital targeting, social media, and online communications to recruit spies. Platforms such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Instagram, and Facebook play a key role in this strategy, allowing Iran to attract financially, socially, or psychologically motivated individuals.
Iran focuses on people facing financial, social, or psychological problems. A review of recent cases shows that the majority of those recruited to spy on minorities are recent immigrants or those with little sense of belonging to Israeli society. The crisis of trust in the regime and concerns about the future create very important incentives for cooperation with Iran. Sociological analysis of this trend shows that Iran exploits the weakness of social cohesion and a weak sense of identity in Israeli society and uses it as an entry point for influence.
Real examples of infiltration and espionage operations
Israeli Minister’s Spying for Iran Case: Former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev is considered one of the most important cases of Iranian influence in Israel’s political and security structure. He eventually pleaded guilty to spying for Iran and reached an agreement with the prosecution to avoid trial on charges of “betrayal of Israel.” According to official reports, Sego had contacts with Iranian diplomats during his years in Nigeria, first as a practicing physician in Abuja and then in two direct meetings with Iranian embassy officials in 2012. The Shin Bet stated that he was effectively recruited by Iranian intelligence and was acting as a spy for Tehran. The investigation revealed that Segow provided Iran with important information about Israeli security officials, sensitive infrastructure, the energy market, and military and civilian bases. Israeli media wrote that he transmitted messages and information using encrypted communication systems and meetings in hotels and apartments around the world. According to interrogations, Segou attempted to introduce some Iranian agents to Israeli officials under the guise of a “harmless businessman” and effectively create a communication channel between Tehran and the Israeli security establishment.
The case of Roy Mizrahi and Elmog Atias: One of the most prominent examples of Iranian espionage in Israel is the case of Roy Mizrahi and Elmog Atias. These two 24-year-olds, who lived in the town of Nash near Haifa, were recruited into Iranian espionage networks. At first, their missions were simple and seemingly trivial: taking photos of their homes, recording car sales signs, and writing anti-government messages. But over time, the missions evolved into more complex tasks, such as installing surveillance cameras and gathering information on senior Israeli officials and military bases. The identity crisis and sense of distrust in the future of the regime among these individuals have reduced their sensitivity to government values and made them more easily attracted to foreign espionage networks.
The Case of Bassem and Taher Safadi: Another important example is the case of Bassem and Taher Safadi, residents of the Druze village of Masada, who were accused of collaborating with Iran. Under the guidance of his father, Taher collected information about the movements of the Israeli army in the Golan Heights and sent it to a reporter on an Iranian television network. This case shows that Iran uses family and social networks to create spy rings and attempts to obtain sensitive information by building trust. Distrust in the future of the regime, a sense of government inefficiency, and a crisis of domestic legitimacy have created conditions in which social and family networks can easily become tools for foreign influence.
The Rafael Rouni case: Rafael Rouni, a 21-year-old Israeli soldier, is another example of infiltration that shows that even people present at strategic military bases are targets of Iranian espionage. Regarding Iran’s security and military influence, Israel’s Channel 15 has admitted that “Iranian information has infiltrated the most sensitive military bases, including the strategic Israeli Air Force base.” In part of his statement, the Israeli Channel 15 reporter emphasized that the recently arrested soldier, Rafael Rouni, was serving as a soldier at one of the strategic Israeli Air Force bases (Hazzarim Base). According to the journalist, Rouhani had been in contact with Iranian agents for a long time and was spying for them. The journalist clarified that Rouhani not only did not regret hurting the security of the regime, but also stated that he was willing to do anything to get money. Israel’s Channel 15 has also warned, citing some Zionist officials, about Iran’s widespread influence in Israel’s military structure. According to this Israeli media outlet, over the past few months, about 50 espionage indictments have been issued against Zionists, 5 of whom were members of the regime’s military.
Shimon Azarzar case: During the 12-Day War, Shimon Azarzar, 27, was arrested on charges of spying for Tehran. According to CNN, he had been communicating online with Iranian agents for a year and provided Iran with sensitive military and air force information, including images of Ramat David Air Base and missile strike sites. Even during Iranian missile attacks, Azzar transmitted detailed information about the hits and worked for Iranian agents, receiving sums of money, including 333 shekels in digital currency. Prosecutors wrote that at one point during the 12-day war, Azzar even texted an Iranian agent while fleeing an Iranian missile attack: “I am currently escaping your missiles and I can give you information about a specific location being hit.” Azzar was previously employed by a contracting company that carried out projects for the Israeli army, police and the defense company Rafael from November 2024 to March 2025.
Data analysis and trends
Studies by the Washington Institute show that from 2013 to 2025, Iran conducted at least 39 espionage operations in Israel, 31 of which involved Israeli nationals and the rest involved Palestinians or other non-Israeli citizens. The average age of the individuals ranged from 13 to 73, with more than half in their teens or twenties. From this data, it can be concluded that Iran simultaneously uses financial, ideological, and psychological incentives to recruit individuals, and this approach has made its espionage network in Israel extensive but less sophisticated.
Israel’s response and countering influence
Israel’s response to Iranian espionage activities has been multifaceted. First, security measures have included the arrest and prosecution of spies. Second, public propaganda and awareness campaigns, such as “Easy Money, Heavy Cost,” have been launched to inform Israeli citizens of the dangers of cooperating with Iran.
Psychological and social analysis of Iranian influence
A review of various cases shows that Iran targets individuals based on psychological, social, and political needs. People who lack a sense of worth or excitement in their daily lives. Israeli researchers say that money is not the only attraction factor, but also the need for meaning, excitement, and a sense of efficacy. This psychological analysis shows that Iran can expand and sustain its espionage networks by exploiting psychological and social gaps. The collapse of trust in the regime and a sense of insecurity about the future deepen these gaps and create conditions for foreign influence.