PNN – The Economist magazine wrote in an analytical report that a peace agreement between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, with US support, could weaken Russia’s position.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network, The Economist magazine claims in an analytical report, referring to the trilateral meeting between US President Donald Trump, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the White House and the “peace agreement” between the leaders of Baku and Yerevan to end the long-standing conflict between the two countries: This agreement weakens Russia’s position in the South Caucasus and also addresses the obstacles and challenges to implementing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The full text of this report follows:
The South Caucasus is a mosaic of warring rivals and closed borders. Watchtowers and bunkers dot its borders. On August 8, Donald Trump met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in an attempt to end the conflict between the two countries. At the White House, the three signed a “peace declaration” and agreements on trade and security. Most notably, Armenia agreed to create a U.S.-run transportation route across its territory, connecting Azerbaijan to its breakaway region of Nakhchivan. The corridor will be called the “Trump Pathway for International Peace and Prosperity,” or TRIPP. US President Trump said: It is a great honor for me.
Aliyev and Pashinyan promised to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. The agreement would weaken the position of Russia, which has long been involved in the conflict, as well as Iran. It is not a formal peace treaty. But it paves the way for a bigger prize: ending one of the world’s most intractable conflicts and easing regional tensions, including normalizing Armenia’s relations with Baku’s ally Turkey. Achieving this will be a test of American diplomacy and of Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves. But Russia could still be a problem.
History of the Baku-Yerevan conflict / Moscow punishes Pashinyan
Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at war for more than 35 years. In the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, Armenian-backed separatists seized Nagorno-Karabakh, a region inside Azerbaijan, and later established a buffer zone. For years, the conflict remained frozen and dormant. Azerbaijan, whose oil and gas industry had boomed, built a powerful army equipped with Turkish and Israeli drones and missiles. In 2020, it recaptured the areas surrounding Karabakh. In 2023, it recaptured the region itself; some 100,000 Armenians (residents of Karabakh) fled and were displaced. Russia, which had supported Armenia in the 1990s, remained silent in the war, Moscow doing so in part to punish Pashinyan, a democrat who seized power from pro-Kremlin rulers in a peaceful revolution in 2018.
2 main obstacles to agreement
Since early 2024, the two sides have been slowly moving toward a peace treaty. In previous talks, they relied on mediators such as Russia, Turkey or the Minsk Group, a multilateral forum set up in the 1990s to address the conflict. But recently they have been talking directly. They finally agreed on a draft treaty in March.
But two obstacles remained. First, Azerbaijan’s insistence that Armenia remove all references to Nagorno-Karabakh from its constitution, which would require a referendum. Second, Azerbaijan’s demand for a transport corridor to Nakhchivan. In 2020, as part of a ceasefire agreement, Aliyev and Pashinyan agreed to open a route that would be supervised by Russian authorities. Both men later backed away from the idea of Russian involvement, but failed to agree on an alternative.
American solution: 99-year lease of corridor to Washington / Russia angers
In such circumstances, Trump offered a partial solution. For months, American negotiators have been going back and forth between Washington and the region to resolve this issue. Armenia will lease the land (Zangezur Corridor) to the US for 99 years, and the US will hire contractors to operate the route. This route will give the US a long-term presence in the security of the region; Russia is deeply angry about this situation.
US concessions to Pashinyan and Aliyev
The US has also offered incentives to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The CEO of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) traveled to Washington with Aliyev to sign an agreement with US oil giant ExxonMobil. Armenia, which lacks Azerbaijan’s natural resources, doesn’t have much to offer the American business-minded president, but it will receive some support in the areas of artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Trump also lifted sanctions that had prevented military cooperation with Azerbaijan since 1992. He also announced a “strategic partnership” with Azerbaijan, a staunch ally of Israel.
But what about Türkiye’s role and benefits?
A peace deal could also pave the way for resolving the differences between Turkey and Armenia. The standoff with Armenia has been “Turkey’s Achilles’ heel in terms of regional influence,” says Nikar Goksel of the International Crisis Group. The rapprochement between the two sides began in 2008 but has since stalled.
To appease Aliyev, Turkey had made normalization of relations with Armenia conditional on a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That obstacle now appears to have been removed. Turkey may decide to open its border with Armenia, which was closed in 1993 in support of Azerbaijan during the Karabakh conflict. “Things will move quickly,” predicts Goksel.
Challenges still persist
Yet, amidst all the Trumpian glitz and show, the agreement still has a lot of work to do. In Washington, Aliyev and Pashinyan put their initials on a formal peace treaty, but they did not sign it. Azerbaijan’s demand to change the Armenian constitution has not yet been implemented. The benefits and advantages of the “Trump route” (Zangezur Corridor) will be concentrated in the Nakhchivan region and Syunik, the sparsely populated province of Armenia through which the route passes. But the hope is that it could pave the way for further agreements. Azerbaijan and Armenia could begin talks about opening other parts of their fortified border.
Domestic and regional obstacles
There are reasons to remain cautious. Pashinyan is unpopular in Armenia: only 13% of Armenians say they trust him. Nationalist hardliners, including former President Robert Kocharyan, accuse him of compromising on Armenian sovereignty. Holding a referendum that Azerbaijan wants would be controversial, and next year’s elections would give Russia an opportunity to interfere. In June, the Armenian government announced it had foiled a coup planned for September.
Azerbaijan could also derail the peace process. Aliyev, the autocrat who succeeded his father in 2003, has previously threatened to seize the transport route by force. He has fueled expansionist dreams, such as calling Armenia “Western Azerbaijan.” Lawrence Brewers of the British think tank Chatham House says such talk, if it continues, will be a “deadly poison” to peace. Azerbaijan’s military superiority simply makes it harder to trust Armenia.