PNN – The internal security center of the Israeli regime, acknowledging its inability to achieve Tel Aviv’s objectives against Hamas and Hezbollah, stressed that Tel Aviv can no longer attain “absolute victory” according to traditional concepts.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network, quoting the Al-Nashra website, the Internal Security Studies Center of the Israeli regime, affiliated with Tel Aviv University, in its new report on the security situation of this regime, has examined the reconstruction of fundamental concepts in the military doctrine of the occupying regime—especially the concepts of victory and decisive victory—taking into account the major developments in the arena of this regime’s confrontations with Palestinians and Arabs from the 1970s until several rounds of war in Gaza and Lebanon and the recent wars with Iran and Yemen.
Tamir Hayman, a retired general of the Israeli army and former head of this regime’s Military Intelligence Directorate, who prepared the report, reviewed the intellectual shifts within the occupying regime’s security institution. These shifts are based on the growing understanding that traditional tools are no longer effective for achieving a decisive military victory in new wars against non-state armed groups.
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According to the report, this draws attention toward concepts of political victory and strategic victory instead of military victory, which reflects a deep crisis in Tel Aviv’s ability to impose its will in long and complex wars. Therefore, the concept of victory must move beyond its traditional framework, which was based on the complete military defeat of the opposing side and the loss of its ability and will to continue fighting.
The report adds that the new concept of victory means achieving certain limited goals and allows Tel Aviv’s officials to justify ending military operations even if the enemy can remain relatively cohesive or preserve some elements of its power. This shift in the concepts of victory indicates acknowledgment that the arenas in which Tel Aviv has fought in recent decades no longer allow for a decisive military victory.
The Internal Security Studies Center of the Israeli regime stressed that since the 1970s, Tel Aviv’s political officials have avoided demanding that the army achieve a decisive victory over non-state actors such as the Palestine Liberation Organization in the past and Hamas and Hezbollah in the current period. Instead, they define achievable objectives without becoming trapped in a long confrontation or an endless war of attrition.
The report also points to a deep internal crisis in the security doctrine of the Israeli regime, stating that Tel Aviv is no longer capable of imagining a complete victory in modern wars and has relied on a political concept of victory based on improving the security situation rather than destroying the enemy. This shift, of course, carries broad strategic implications and redirects efforts from military decisiveness toward external political arrangements, describing Tel Aviv’s power as temporary and incomplete.
The author of the report emphasized that this situation reveals that Tel Aviv, in the era of non-state actors, faces limitations on its military power and implicitly acknowledges that strategic victory cannot be achieved solely through force; for example, in Gaza, the continued political and social presence of Hamas gradually erodes any military victory Tel Aviv may claim over time.
The report concludes that victory in the discourse of the Israeli regime is a long-term political process dependent on external arrangements and the ability to reshape the regional environment, not an outcome guaranteed by military machinery.