PNN – Citing John Mearsheimer’s analysis, the Arabic newspaper Al-Quds wrote: A war with Tehran could become a symbol of America’s strategic decline; a battle that, according to the author, has not only failed to achieve Washington’s goals, but has also exposed deep gaps in the United States’ political and military calculations.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network; The Jerusalem-based Arabic newspaper Al-Quds wrote in a report that from Washington’s perspective, the wars were not simply battles over territory or security, but rather were themselves manifestations of American superiority.
The newspaper went on to discuss the analysis of John Mearsheimer, a prominent political scientist and professor at the University of Chicago, about Washington’s failure in Iran, adding: Mearsheimer has argued repeatedly and with unusual candor that this war is an unassailable defeat for America, and that President Donald Trump has no acceptable way out but to admit defeat. What makes his assessment so thought-provoking and alarming is not just its unparalleled candor, but the growing reality that even many in the Washington foreign policy establishment can no longer ignore: the United States has entered yet another war that it has easily started and ruthlessly escalated, but which it is politically incapable of winning.
At the center of this disaster was Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose decades-long obsession with confronting Iran had led Washington to this disastrous confrontation. Reports of a February 11, 2026, meeting in the White House Situation Room suggest that Netanyahu personally pressured Trump to willingly accept military escalation against Tehran, arguing that removing the top and second tiers of Iranian leadership would lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic.
The illusion was seductive and familiar. The plan was to transform Iraq into a model democracy after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Libya was expected to stabilize after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. There were repeated predictions of the collapse of Syria. Yet, instead of all these predictions and illusions, each of these interventions led to chaos, disintegration, and long-term instability that fueled anti-American sentiment throughout the region.
But Iran has emerged as far more resilient than these countries because (the author claims) its political system, despite internal divisions and some public discontent, has enjoyed institutional depth, ideological coherence, and national resilience, forged over decades of sanctions, isolation, and external threats. The hypothesis that the assassination of senior leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran would lead to the collapse of its political system demonstrates not strategic sophistication but a profound misunderstanding of Iranian society and political history.
Now, this miscalculation, in itself, defines the war. Washington’s goals were broad. The idea was to weaken Iran to the point of submission, its regional influence eroded, its missile capabilities neutralized, and its government either surrendered or collapsed. Some within the administration and among its allies believed that the assassination of military commanders and senior officials would cause panic, disintegration, and the eventual collapse of the government. Instead, the opposite happened. The Iranian government remained strong. Its leadership structure adapted. Its military institutions withstood severe blows without collapsing. And perhaps most dangerously for Washington, the war turned into a protracted confrontation that gradually eroded American political credibility while simultaneously strengthening Iranian resolve.
The deeper problem is not simply that the United States failed to achieve a decisive victory, but that the war exposed structural weaknesses in American power that Washington had worked to conceal for decades.
Since the end of the Cold War, American politicians have operated on the assumption that no actor in the region can meaningfully resist American military superiority. Iraq has been a disaster. Afghanistan has become the longest war in American history, ending with Washington’s humiliating withdrawal. Libya has disintegrated after Western intervention. Yet, despite all these failures, Washington continues to behave as if military dominance guarantees (the desired) political outcomes.
Iran shattered this illusion fearlessly and more forcefully than in any other war.
Unlike the weak states that had previously been targeted by the United States, Iran had the strategic depth, regional alliances, missile deterrence, and political will to withstand severe attacks. Most importantly, Tehran understood something that Washington had repeatedly failed to understand: “Survival itself can be a victory against a stronger enemy.” Iran did not need to defeat the United States militarily; it only needed to thwart Washington’s pursuit of its goals while imposing increasing economic, political, and geopolitical costs on it.
Energy markets were volatile and turbulent, and global shipping lanes were disrupted. America’s allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf also became increasingly anxious about Washington’s perception and unpredictability. China and Russia found an opportunity to deepen their diplomatic and economic influence and present themselves as stable actors. Meanwhile, within the United States itself, public frustration and exhaustion deepened as it became impossible to ignore the costs of another endless war in the Middle East.
That is precisely why Mearsheimer believes that Trump has no objective, reliable path forward. Escalating tensions risks regional catastrophe, but it also does not guarantee success. Retreating without achieving the goals seems no different from defeat. The claim of victory also seems hollow, because Iran is standing firm, bold, and tenacious, and capable of continuing to resist. The White House is thus caught between an unattainable military victory and the political humiliation that comes from admitting strategic defeat.
The most worrying aspect of this war seems to be the exposure of the ideological exhaustion or collapse of American foreign policy. The Washington political class has been ruminating on the same assumptions over and over again for years, despite repeated collapses. Each failure is interpreted not as evidence of strategic failure, but as evidence that previous wars lacked the necessary aggression and were not long enough or brutal enough. The result is a dangerous cycle in which Washington never truly learns the lessons.
Empires rarely recognize their moment of decline as they experience decline. They continue to project their confidence long after their credibility has been eroded. They mistake rhetoric for power and military spending for strategic wisdom. The danger that lurks in America is not simply the possibility of losing a war, but the fact that it may continue to wage wars in order to ignore and deny the fact that the world has undergone fundamental changes.
Netanyahu’s delusion of regime change, and Trump’s eagerness to believe it, will likely go down in history alongside Vietnam and Iraq, not as a show of strength, but as a warning about the arrogance, deceit, and consequences of leaders who mistake power for reality.