A New Problem for Pentagon in Replenishing Weapons Stockpiles amidst War with Iran

Pentagon

PNN – A shortage of a critical raw material used in the production of Patriot missiles has presented a new challenge for the Pentagon.

According to the report of Pakistan News Network; as U.S. stockpiles of Patriot interceptor missiles have dwindled significantly, the Pentagon is facing difficulties in securing a key raw material essential for their manufacture.

“Carbonized rayon” fibers—used in the production of the motor nozzles for Patriot missiles—are primarily supplied by a French company. The firm has indicated that its production capacity is limited and that it cannot rapidly meet the growing demand from the United States.

The Wall Street Journal reported that the difficulty in securing this material serves as an example of the vulnerabilities within the U.S. arms production supply chain. To ramp up the production of its interceptor missiles, the Pentagon requires materials and components that, in some cases, are produced by only one or a few companies worldwide. Under these circumstances, a shortage of a single raw material can disrupt the manufacturing process of a weapons system.

Dependence of Patriot Missiles on a French Supplier

In its original form, rayon fiber is an ordinary material; however, after undergoing a carbonization process, it becomes resistant to extremely high temperatures. This characteristic is essential for manufacturing the engine nozzles of advanced Patriot interceptor missiles—missiles deployed by the United States and several of its allies to counter missile attacks.

Currently, only one specific type of rayon is certified for use in the most advanced Patriot missiles, the PAC-3 MSE. This product is manufactured by the French company ArianeGroup, while the American firm Park Aerospace serves as its sole distributor in North America.

The production chain for this material begins in the Czech Republic. The raw fibers are manufactured at a plant owned by a Thai chemical company and subsequently transported to France. There, the fibers are processed into fabric, which is then carbonized by ArianeGroup at its facilities near the city of Bordeaux.

The final product, in the form of black rolls, is shipped to the Park Aerospace plant in the U.S. state of Kansas. The company coats the fibers with a specialized resin and, once the preparation process is complete, supplies them to L3Harris. L3Harris then utilizes this material in the manufacturing of rocket motor nozzles for Patriot missiles.

As the Pentagon’s need for interceptor missiles grows, officials have asked Park Aerospace to increase its procurement of Rayon. However, Brian Shore, the company’s CEO, notes that the French supplier has limited capacity and cannot be coerced into ramping up production. He told The Wall Street Journal: They are a French company. You can’t force them. In a situation like this, they might simply stop their operations.

Depletion of Missile Stockpiles and Challenges in Increasing Production

The issue regarding the supply of interceptors has emerged at a time when U.S. stocks of such missiles have rapidly dwindled due to the war against Iran. According to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), by the end of July, U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles had fallen by approximately 65 percent compared to their levels prior to the start of the war against Iran in February.

The PAC-3 MSE is one of the most advanced interceptors in the Patriot system. It destroys targets through direct impact and is capable of engaging ballistic missiles and other incoming projectiles. Each missile costs approximately four million dollars and takes nearly two years to manufacture. Furthermore, the production of a single missile requires hundreds of specialized components and raw materials.

To increase production, the Pentagon has entered into long-term contracts with the primary manufacturers of this system. Under a seven-year agreement with Lockheed Martin, the production of PAC-3 MSE missiles is set to reach approximately 2,000 units per year by the end of 2030. The Department is also collaborating with L3Harris to boost production.

However, increasing the production capacity of the primary manufacturers alone will not solve the problem. Hundreds of companies—both large and small—operate across various tiers of the defense supply chain, and the prime contractors rely on them for the components and raw materials needed to build these weapons. If any one of these companies fails to fulfill its orders, the production of the entire system faces disruption.

Data from the defense software firm “Air” indicates a high degree of shared dependency among U.S. arms suppliers. More than 70 percent of the second-tier suppliers for PAC-3 missiles also provide components for the THAAD missile defense system. Furthermore, 69 percent of the 3,300 third-tier suppliers are involved in the production chains for five different missile systems: PAC-3, THAAD, SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6.

This concentration of production leaves the U.S. defense industry vulnerable to disruptions in supplier operations. The closure of a single factory, a labor strike, or an industrial accident could simultaneously impact the production of multiple weapons systems.

Why Did the Production Capacity of the U.S. Defense Industry Decline?

The Wall Street Journal attributes part of the current challenges to structural changes within the U.S. defense industry following the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. government—aiming to reduce military expenditures—curtailed its orders for weaponry. As a result of this policy, major aerospace and defense firms gradually merged, and the number of prime contractors in the industry dropped from 51 to five.

During this period, many small, specialized firms that produced components and raw materials for the defense industry either exited the market or ceased operations. Some production was also relocated outside the United States. According to a 2022 Pentagon report, the number of small businesses active within the U.S. defense industrial base had declined by 40 percent over the preceding decade.

To compensate for this loss of capacity, the Pentagon is now seeking to engage directly with smaller companies and lower-tier suppliers. The objective is to identify production bottlenecks in areas where major defense contractors do not exercise direct control.

However, restructuring the supplier network is no simple task. Establishing new factories, procuring equipment, securing a skilled workforce, and obtaining the necessary permits are time-consuming processes. Furthermore, the use of alternative materials requires rigorous testing. In the missile industry, even a minor flaw in raw materials can compromise a missile’s performance; consequently, replacing a certified material with a different product cannot be done quickly.

Efforts to Identify Alternative Sources

To increase the supply of rayon, Park Aerospace has initially provided $5 million to ArianeGroup to accelerate the establishment of a new production line at the company’s French facility. While this production line is expected to become operational by 2028, its capacity will be insufficient to meet the entirety of the United States’ requirements.

The two companies have also reached a preliminary agreement to establish a manufacturing plant in the United States. Park Aerospace has committed to an upfront payment of $25 million to advance this initiative. If the plans proceed, the new facility is expected to open around 2030. This timeline indicates that, even with this new investment, the U.S. will remain dependent on foreign manufacturers for several more years.

One obstacle to increasing ArianeGroup’s exports to the U.S. is the company’s existing commitments to its European clients. Allocating a larger share of current production to the U.S. could reduce the supply available to other customers, including the French military. While ArianeGroup has stated that it is planning to expand its production capacity, it has not provided specific details regarding its ability to meet U.S. requirements in the immediate term.

The Pentagon has another option in Europe as well. The German company Enka produces rayon in the city of Obernburg; however, its product has not yet been certified for use in the PAC-3 MSE missile. Furthermore, Enka is facing financial difficulties and intends to cease its factory operations.

After Enka’s management announced plans to close the plant in January of last year, the American firm ICF Mercantile and Pentagon officials entered into negotiations to prevent the halt in production. Ultimately, U.S. defense contractors and the Pentagon committed to purchasing a significant quantity of the company’s rayon. The Pentagon has pledged to acquire over 470,000 pounds—approximately 213 metric tons—of this product over the course of two years.

A Small Material in a Vast Chain

Carbonized rayon plays a crucial role in the construction of engine nozzles for interceptor missiles, thanks to its resistance to extreme heat. When the engine ignites, the temperature of the combustion gases can exceed 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit. The layer of carbonized rayon inside the nozzle gradually erodes, preventing the engine casing from melting under this intense heat.

This material was not originally developed for such an application. In 1958, researchers at the American company Union Carbide discovered that gradually heating rayon in a vacuum could transform it into carbon fibers capable of withstanding high temperatures. This very property later paved the way for its use in the aerospace industry and the manufacturing of rocket engines.

Preparing these fibers for military applications is also a complex process. The fibers must be continuous and free of impurities, and the washing and processing stages require a high degree of precision. Furthermore, replacing this material with alternatives necessitates extensive testing; companies must ensure that any new materials perform reliably under extreme thermal and pressure conditions.

The current challenge facing the Pentagon demonstrates that increasing the production of advanced missiles is not merely a matter of placing larger orders with major defense contractors. Achieving this goal requires an extensive network of suppliers providing raw materials and specialized components. If even a single link in this supply chain fails to meet production requirements, expanding the capacity of the primary manufacturing facilities will not necessarily result in a higher output of missiles.

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