PNN – Al Jazeera has examined Iran’s sources of power and leverage for the period following the expiration of the so-called 60-day deadline.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network; amidst regional and international media analyses regarding scenarios following the 60-day deadline—set under the Islamabad agreement between Iran and the US—Al Jazeera published a report titled “The 60-Day Deadline has expired… What Are Iran’s Political and Military Options?” The report notes that the 60-day period established by the Islamabad understanding for reaching a final agreement between Iran and the United States concludes on Monday, August 17; however, this period has not been marked by sustained calm.
Following the signing of the Islamabad agreement and the temporary cessation of hostilities, tensions between Iran and the United States briefly resurfaced before the intensity of the confrontation subsided once more. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts shifted toward new negotiations between Iran and Oman regarding navigation arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s Clear Stance on the “Expiration of the 60-Day Deadline”
Over the past few weeks, Tehran and Washington have traded accusations regarding violations of the understanding. Washington has failed to lift its naval blockade in accordance with the timeline stipulated in the agreement, while Iran has kept the Strait of Hormuz closed, conditioning its reopening on the lifting of the blockade and the release of its frozen assets.
Throughout this period, indirect contacts via intermediaries have continued, yet negotiations between Iran and the United States have not resumed, nor has any agreement been reached to extend the deadline. Hours before the 60-day deadline expired, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on Sunday that the Islamabad memorandum stipulated an “end to the war,” rather than a temporary 60-day ceasefire.
The Iranian Foreign Minister emphasized that the United States had violated the memorandum—thereby triggering a resurgence of tensions—and that, consequently, there is no 60-day ceasefire requiring an extension. Tehran has not yet made a decision regarding the resumption of negotiations with Washington.
Araghchi’s remarks indicate that Tehran does not view August 17 as an automatic trigger for transitioning from a ceasefire to war; rather, it regards the date as the expiration of the deadline set for reaching a final agreement—negotiations that, in reality, never began.
Iran Rejects the Concept of a Temporary Ceasefire
While Iran is not closing the door to diplomacy, its approach to the next phase is based on maintaining leverage—primarily through the Strait of Hormuz—while simultaneously enhancing military readiness and preparing for a potential long-term conflict.
On June 18, Iran and the United States signed the 14-point Islamabad Memorandum. The memorandum stipulated that a final agreement—renewable by mutual consent—be reached within 60 days, hostilities cease on all fronts, the U.S. naval blockade against Iran be gradually lifted, Iran guarantee the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, and exemptions be granted for Iranian oil exports alongside the release of frozen assets.
Iran’s stance stems from its rejection of the characterization of the recent period as a continuous 60-day ceasefire. Tehran maintains that the failure to lift the naval blockade and unfreeze assets, combined with the resumption of military operations and ongoing Israeli attacks on Lebanon, has rendered the memorandum meaningless and halted the transition to negotiations for a final agreement.
Article 13 also conditioned the start of negotiations for a final agreement on the implementation of clauses regarding the end of the war, the lifting of the blockade, guarantees for the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, the granting of oil waivers, and the unfreezing of assets.
Since the signing of the memorandum, Washington has shown no positive inclination to fulfill its obligations. The prevailing view in Tehran is that there is currently no ceasefire; the war continues, even if its intensity and methods have changed. Therefore, the expiration of the 60-day deadline does not signify a sudden shift from peace to war.
Based on this perspective, Iran is not seeking to extend the existing ceasefire; rather, it demands the reactivation of the memorandum whose implementation has been blocked by the United States. Consequently, Tehran denies reports regarding an agreement to extend the ceasefire and insists that Washington’s return to its prior commitments is a prerequisite for any new round of negotiations.
Following the suspension of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the re-escalation of tensions, diplomatic efforts have focused on Iran-Oman talks on temporary navigation arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz. The talks aim to create safe passage for ships entering and exiting the strait, as well as discuss the future management structure and maritime services.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry stressed that the talks aim to establish safe navigation routes that respect the sovereign rights and security considerations of Iran and Oman.
A joint statement issued by the two countries also stressed the need to respect their sovereignty and rights as two coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran Is Negotiating from a Position of Strength
Based on this assessment, Iran’s insistence on the need to end the war across all fronts reflects the belief that it is negotiating from a position of strength; should the U.S. persist in violating the agreement, Iran would expand its demands.
Experts believe that Iran has learned lessons from two previous rounds of conflict and has modified its military and security structures to prepare for a protracted conflict—one that extends beyond mere exchanges of fire to encompass the economy, maritime navigation, domestic politics, and psychological warfare.
Analysts also agree that Iran will not close the door to negotiations, though it will not return to the table under previous conditions or based solely on political commitments. Iranian officials consistently emphasize that they are not shutting the door to talks, yet they view negotiations as another form of conflict.
Consequently, the expiration of the 60-day deadline does not appear—in Iran’s calculations—to mark a moment for a unilateral choice between war and peace; rather, it represents a phase in a protracted confrontation wherein Tehran employs diplomacy, military readiness, and the control of maritime navigation as parallel tools.
In other words, the transition to a new agreement remains contingent on whether Washington—from Iran’s perspective—takes acceptable steps regarding sanctions and frozen assets, rather than merely extending a deadline whose terms Tehran believes were never met in the first place.