PNN – The escalation of crises—spanning from the Middle East and Ukraine to East Asia—has confronted the United States with resource constraints and a dispersal of its capabilities; a situation China is seeking to exploit to expand its influence and solidify its position.
Currently, the U.S. is grappling with a host of crises—ranging from tensions with Iran and involvement in Gaza and Lebanon to the war of attrition in Ukraine and intensifying competition with China—forcing it to divide its focus and resources across these various fronts. This situation reveals signs of a practical shift away from the Indo-Pacific priority, despite Washington’s stated goal of containing China.
The latest instance involves the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington from the Pacific to the Middle East to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln—which has been on a mission for over 250 days—a move that temporarily leaves the Western Pacific without a U.S. aircraft carrier.
Successive Crises: Splitting U.S. Capabilities across Multiple Fronts
Continued interventionism in West Asia and U.S. acts of aggression against Iran, alongside Washington’s military commitments in Europe and escalating rivalry with China, have driven up the cost of maintaining U.S. power across multiple fronts simultaneously. The transfer of the USS George Washington to West Asia is the latest indication of this cost and pressure.
The significance of this redeployment is heightened by the fact that the Western Pacific is considered the primary theater of military rivalry between the United States and China. The Associated Press and Stars and Stripes have reported that the departure of the George Washington—amidst increasing Chinese military activity in the region—has raised questions regarding Washington’s ability to maintain deterrence and reassure its allies.
The strain of the conflict is evident not only in the redeployment of naval vessels and troops but has also extended to U.S. weapons stockpiles. Reuters reported on August 4 that, during the five-month confrontation involving Iran, the U.S. military has depleted nearly its entire inventory of long-range precision missiles—including ATACMS and PrSMs—while also expending approximately 65 percent of its Patriot interceptors, 38 percent of THAAD interceptors, and nearly half of its Tomahawk cruise missiles.
These figures indicate that the issue is not merely the transfer of a single naval vessel or the temporary relocation of forces; rather, the sustained nature of U.S. military operations in the Middle East has strained the very capabilities Washington requires to deter its major rivals.
Reuters has warned that the depletion of weapons stockpiles could compromise U.S. readiness for potential future conflicts with powers such as China and Russia—a concern that takes on added significance given the temporary absence of an aircraft carrier from the Western Pacific.
From this perspective, recent developments cannot be viewed merely as a sign of a U.S. retreat from Asia; rather, they serve as a clear indication of the costs associated with military interventions and the overextension of Washington’s capabilities. While the United States commits a portion of its military capacity to sustaining conflicts in the Middle East, China retains the opportunity to expand the scope of its activities and influence in the primary arena of its strategic rivalry with Washington—a dynamic that frames the report’s central question regarding how Beijing will capitalize on this new landscape.
How is China expanding its sphere of influence?
In the face of aggressive actions by the United States and the Zionist regime against Iran, China—unlike Washington, which has deployed a significant portion of its military might to the Middle East—did not engage in direct confrontation; instead, it sought to leverage the economic and geopolitical consequences of the crisis to strengthen its own position.
A Brookings Institution report notes that while the conflict involving Iran has imposed costs on Beijing—such as rising energy prices—it has simultaneously created opportunities to bolster China’s standing in clean energy technologies, strengthen ties with developing nations, and advance the narrative of a multipolar order.
One of the clearest indications of this trend is evident in the energy and transportation markets. Reuters recently reported that China’s exports of electric trucks more than doubled following the outbreak of the conflict on February 28, with shipments to South Asian countries surging fivefold compared to the same period last year.
The spike in fuel prices—driven by disruptions to oil tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—has boosted demand for electric vehicles; meanwhile, Chinese companies are capturing markets formerly dominated by traditional manufacturers by offering lower-priced models and comprehensive packages that include both the vehicles and charging infrastructure.
This opportunity is also extending to larger markets in the Global South, where a comparison between China and the United States offers a clearer picture. In 2025, trade between China and Africa reached $348 billion—a 17.7% increase—with Chinese exports to Africa growing at a faster pace than imports from the continent. Furthermore, starting in May 2026, Beijing implemented a zero-tariff policy for goods from African nations maintaining diplomatic relations with China. These measures come at a time when U.S. tariff policies have raised the cost for many developing economies to access the American market.
At the same time, Beijing is capitalizing on the reduced U.S. military focus to consolidate its position in its immediate periphery. According to Reuters, as global attention remains fixed on the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, China has stepped up its military and strategic activities in the Indo-Pacific. The latest example is the completion of the first phase of construction on Antelope Reef in the South China Sea.
Satellite imagery reveals an artificial island nearly six kilometers long, featuring a harbor with a roughly 680-meter pier and infrastructure that includes a straight stretch exceeding three kilometers—a feature that could potentially be converted into a runway in the future. Such infrastructure enhances China’s capacity for a sustained presence in the region at a time when the U.S. has redeployed a portion of its naval assets to the Middle East.
However, China’s current advantage should not be reduced merely to its growing military or economic might. Beijing’s most significant achievement lies in its ability to turn others’ crises into opportunities to expand its own ties, all without incurring comparable political or military costs.
While the United States has been compelled to redeploy aircraft carriers, deplete weapons stockpiles, and concentrate resources in the Middle East to manage conflicts, China is able to simultaneously expand its trade in emerging markets, replace costlier Western alternatives with its own technology and products, and bolster its strategic presence in East Asia. This distinction is precisely what transforms the notion of “how Beijing profits from Washington’s crises” from a general claim into a measurable trend.
Competition amidst Crisis: Cementing China’s Position in the New Order
Experts believe that China is not attempting to rapidly fill the vacuum left by U.S. engagement; rather, it is leveraging the dissipation of Washington’s resources to gradually strengthen its own economic, financial, and diplomatic ties. Reuters reports that, amidst growing doubts regarding U.S. capabilities, Arab Gulf states are increasingly looking to China to help manage regional tensions and safeguard trade routes.
This trend is also evident in China’s trade with Asian nations. Trade between China and ASEAN grew by 18.2 percent to reach 4.34 trillion yuan in the first half of 2026, while China’s electricity exports to these countries surged by 42.9 percent amidst concerns over the energy crisis. These figures indicate that Beijing is leveraging its economic capacity to deepen interdependence with countries in the region.
At the same time, China is striving to reduce its reliance on US-dominated financial infrastructure. According to data from China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the volume of cross-border receipts and payments by China’s non-banking sector reached $9.2 trillion in the first half of 2026, with the yuan accounting for 52.9% of the country’s cross-border settlements. While these figures may not threaten the dollar’s position, they signal the expansion of China’s independent financial capacity.
In the political arena, too, China occupies a position distinct from that of the United States due to its simultaneous ties with Iran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Without directly engaging in conflict or incurring the military costs that Washington does, Beijing can leverage its economic and diplomatic relations to enhance its political role. From this perspective, the longer the various crises in the region persist, the greater the opportunity for China to strengthen its ties and increase its bargaining power—both within the region and beyond.