PNN – The National Interest acknowledged that the resilience of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s political structure and the ineffectiveness of the regime-change scenario have prevented the United States from achieving its stated objectives.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network; In an analysis authored by Sarah Demicchino, this American magazine writes: The memorandum of understanding to end the war—the signing of which initiates a 60-day negotiation period to finalize the terms of the agreement—includes sanctions relief, ambiguous language regarding the nuclear issue, Iran’s operational control over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, and a massive $300 billion economic development plan.
Peeling back the layers of Washington’s official propaganda, *The National Interest* emphasizes that—regardless of what transpired during so-called back-channel negotiations or the damage inflicted on Iran through joint aggressive attacks by the U.S. and the Zionist regime—it is an undeniable fact that Washington has failed to achieve the primary objectives of this aggression: the Iranian regime has not been toppled, nuclear materials have not been removed from the country, and Iran’s missile program remains intact. Conversely, the Islamic Republic of Iran established effective deterrence by leveraging the geostrategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States depleted over $130 billion worth of its advanced weaponry stockpiles.
According to this report, the war against Iran was fundamentally an unwise move and a miscalculation, rooted in the Trump administration’s delusional doctrine regarding the rapid collapse of the Iranian government. However, as the conflict dragged on and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz inflicted a global economic blow, there was no longer any conceivable path for the United States to achieve anything resembling victory.
It was at this juncture—faced with far more catastrophic alternatives—that Washington entered a phase of negotiation and agreement. This was the best possible course of action for the United States. The U.S. was compelled to end the war for three primary reasons:
First: The United States’ capacity to cope with the depletion of strategic munition stockpiles—some items of which cost between $2 million and $29 million—has eroded, while the process of replenishing them takes years.
Second: The necessity of reopening the Strait of Hormuz. The continued closure of this waterway—through which 20 percent of the world’s oil flows—disrupts global supply chains, fuels inflation, and places additional strain on other regional chokepoints.
Third: The West’s lack of preparedness for a war of attrition. No one was ready for a protracted conflict—neither US officials, who had been misled by Israeli predictions of the Iranian regime’s imminent collapse; nor the Persian Gulf states, which fell victim to the war’s collateral damage; and certainly not the American public, who had been promised an operation lasting “four to five weeks” but instead faced hundreds of casualties and an inflation rate exceeding 4 percent.
Washington can hardly claim victory; instead, an agreement with Iran—as opposed to a futile, war of attrition—represents a more dignified form of defeat for the White House.