PNN – In the post-war era, Iran views the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and a tool to control the adversary’s aggressive behavior.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network; US President Donald Trump—continuing his pattern of reneging on international agreements—accused Iran of violating the Islamabad memorandum; he then claimed, via a post on Truth Social, that targets within Iranian territory had been struck due to a ceasefire violation. This preemptive move by the U.S. President—strongly reminiscent of Trump’s tweets and stances during the “Ramadan War” era—comes at a time when Iran and the U.S. had been observing a ceasefire and had reached a 14-point understanding following June 17. The root of these new tensions lies in the American side’s interpretation and application of that understanding. The U.S. sought to implement an interpretation and outcome aligned with its own strategic interests in the practical political arena—an approach bearing a striking resemblance to its conduct regarding the Lebanon file.
In reality, the United States seeks arrangements that differ from the memorandum of understanding it originally signed. What we observe in practice is Washington attempting to secure a highly favorable outcome from this memorandum while simultaneously insisting that Iran adhere to its terms—albeit subject to American interpretation and the exercise of American power. This mirrors the approach the U.S. adopted in Lebanon, where it acted as a mediator to broker a new framework agreement between the Zionist regime and the Lebanese government, thereby paving the way to serve its own interests.
Echoing Trump, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also addressed the reasons behind his country’s violation of the terms of the Islamabad Memorandum, stating: While we desire an agreement, we do not want one at any cost. Rubio went on to emphasize: We want to ensure that no part of the agreement undermines, in any way, the security and stability of any of our partners in the Persian Gulf region.
A review of the positions held by Trump and Rubio reveals that the objectives the United States sought to achieve through the Islamabad Memorandum regarding the Strait of Hormuz differed from the terms actually stipulated in that agreement. The aim was to revert the Strait to its pre-war status—yielding no gains for Iran—despite the fact that, ever since the closure of the Strait, senior Iranian officials had consistently emphasized that this vital waterway would never return to the conditions that existed prior to the Ramadan War.
Washington seeks to preserve freedom of navigation and eliminate concerns regarding a recurrence of this situation in other global waterways. To achieve this objective, the U.S. aims to establish an “Omani-American corridor” in the southern section of the Strait of Hormuz while undermining the northern corridor controlled by Iran. Admittedly, this process and course of action constitute a clear violation of Clause 5 of the memorandum. Yet, the more critical question is whether Washington can impose its own preferences, demands, and will within the broader context of this agreement.
A lack of geographic proximity is a significant aspect of the current situation and a key factor in answering this question. Iran is situated along the northern coast of the Persian Gulf—in close proximity to the Strait—and possesses access to coastal territories and islands that are vital for surveillance, targeting, and potentially disrupting operations in the region. While foreign powers can deploy massive military forces to the area, they can never alter the physical environment or the dictates of geography that govern it. A narrow waterway, local knowledge, short reaction times, and dispersed assets enable Iran to generate a high degree of uncertainty.
That is why Iran’s significance here is structural rather than a matter of rhetoric or words; it is a significance embedded in geography. Iran’s strategy here is not merely about possessing a sustained capacity to control this waterway, nor does it entail managing international trade flows or engaging in conventional naval competition with the United States. Rather, the core issue is maritime interdiction—specifically, the critical ability to slow down the use of a route, make it costly, or render it politically difficult to utilize.
Recent conflict experience has clearly demonstrated that there is no need to defeat the U.S. Navy in a decisive battle. Iran is capable of simply raising the cost of disruption to a level that compels commercial actors—including major maritime shipping companies—to either alter their routes or opt to transit via Iranian-controlled waters under clear arrangements. Otherwise, shipping companies will either reroute or demand guarantees that U.S. military escorts alone cannot provide.
While the U.S. Navy might well be capable of largely defending itself or mounting a counter-response, it must be acknowledged that mine-clearing, escort operations, and retaliatory strikes are not synonymous with a return to normal maritime commerce. Even following the recent ceasefire and understanding, vessels transited the strait only under strictly managed arrangements; meanwhile, many faced delays and remained subject to high insurance risks and complex operational procedures. The gap between a waterway that is technically open and one that is commercially viable is precisely where Iran retains its leverage.
All in all, it appears that American intent and resolve alone cannot resolve the primary challenge facing capitalists and merchants. The key question confronting global market participants is whether normal commercial transit can be sustained without endless military operations, exorbitant insurance premiums, stranded vessels, or the constant threat of a broader regional war. Recent traffic patterns following the official reopening indicate that a military announcement cannot automatically restore confidence; shipping companies base their decisions on actual risks and hazards, not on declarations.
If Iran is determined to maintain the existing framework and uphold the established arrangements within the Strait, sporadic tensions make it difficult to reach a situation where the U.S.’s actual intent and will can be realized—even if the terms of the memorandum suggest otherwise. It must be borne in mind that, since the war, Iran has viewed the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and a tool to curb the adversary’s aggressive behavior. Acknowledging geographical realities and Iran’s genuine resolve appears to be the logical path to overcoming this crisis.