PNN – Al-Akhbar wrote: Although it is too early to judge a possible agreement between Iran and the United States, Tel Aviv’s fumbling shows that the regime is afraid of the security and geopolitical consequences of the agreement.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar wrote in an article that the Zionist regime is expressing increasing concern about a possible agreement between the two sides after information was leaked about a draft memorandum of understanding being prepared between Washington and Tehran. Tel Aviv is worried that the possible agreement will become a weak point for the regime.
The war that the United States and the Zionist regime launched against Iran with the aim of overthrowing Iranian sovereignty is entering its final stages, while its most important results are the consolidation of Iranian sovereignty and the strengthening of Iran’s strategic position, power, and status in the regional and international arena. In an analysis published by the Hebrew newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, the Zionist regime’s deep concern over the leak of information related to the draft memorandum of understanding being prepared between Washington and Tehran is revealed. Decision-making circles in Tel Aviv are concerned that the potential agreement will not guarantee the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear project in the way that Israel hoped, and will not limit the ballistic missile program, or stop the activities of Iran’s regional allies.
According to Al-Akhbar, these concerns are only a small part of the overall picture and the overarching reality of the Iran war; the negative strategic consequences of this war on Israel, including the realignment of Iran’s position deep in the region, the erosion of deterrence, and ultimately the possibility of a future US withdrawal from the region, may be broader and deeper than is being announced at this stage.
Al-Akhbar adds that although it is still too early to talk about the end of the war or an agreement, and it is still not possible to provide a final and accurate assessment of the gains and losses of the parties involved, and its consequences for the region and the entire world, signs of Israeli concern have appeared at various levels, the most prominent of which can be seen in the following:
First: Security Gaps
The main concern of the Zionist regime is centered on the clauses removed from the agreement. The draft of the understanding presented does not oblige Tehran to dismantle its nuclear project in the way that Tel Aviv desires. Rather, according to the common formula, it allows Iran to keep 60 percent enriched uranium on its soil. Despite reports that Iran initially agreed to transfer this uranium abroad, the current text of the final settlement postpones this issue to subsequent rounds of negotiations.
The same applies to the issue of ballistic missiles and drones, which have been completely removed from the current text under the pretext of being postponed to later stages. Zionist sources believe that the current draft agreement does not impose any restrictions on the activities of Iran’s regional allies, especially Hezbollah, Ansar Allah and Iraqi resistance groups. The draft also calls for a cessation of hostile actions on all fronts, including the Lebanese front, which effectively means limiting Tel Aviv’s hand in aggression against Lebanon, and the Zionist regime’s security circles describe it as a “disastrous strategic outcome” for themselves.
Second: Reconfiguration of Iran’s position and geopolitical transformation
The Zionist regime’s concerns have gone beyond the technical aspects of the agreement to its geopolitical implications. Despite Tehran’s rejection of the US proposal to impose new sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, decision-making circles in Tel Aviv are concerned that any flexibility on the part of the US in the negotiations would lead to a tacit admission by Iran of its ability to influence the security of the Strait, which would strengthen its regional position and make it an indispensable player in the security and economic equations. Also, the partial or complete release of Iran’s frozen assets abroad would provide Tehran with financial liquidity that would enable it to address the economic consequences of the war and sanctions, while continuing to support its regional partners on various fronts, doubling the level of threats facing the Zionist regime.
Third: The Isolation of the Zionist Regime
This clause is perhaps the most profound and influential, and evens the most dangerous, concern of the Zionist regime in the long term. The negotiation process that the US is pursuing through the mediation of Pakistan and Qatar, without the participation of Tel Aviv in its substantive discussions, represents a transformation in the Zionist regime’s position from a “strategic partner” to something like a “pressure card” that is used when needed, and then ignored when the moment of approaching an agreement.
This is not limited to the loss of the Zionist regime’s position, but also to the possibility of the formation of major regional agreements contrary to Tel Aviv’s interests, in a situation where Tel Aviv does not have the ability to veto them or even reduce their consequences or direct them in a way that secures its interests.
Al-Akhbar concludes that the current process of negotiations between Washington and Tehran is nothing more than postponing the main points of disagreement to the next stages of negotiations. Of course, there are relatively promising signs that the parties are willing to reach an agreement and make mutual concessions in this direction, but it is still too early to speak with certainty about a permanent agreement or stable and durable arrangements.
Israeli security circles therefore believe that reaching a final agreement in the near future is impossible. They believe that any real understanding requires substantial concessions from Iran, which currently seem difficult, and this requires postponing more sensitive issues to later stages.
But the paradox that worries Tel Aviv is that this very postponement may weaken the US negotiating position over time. The US government, after lengthy negotiations, may find itself in a position where it is relatively unable to activate the levers of military pressure, which means giving Iran the advantage of time and providing it with the opportunity to gradually renege on its difficult obligations.a

