PNN – A Zionist expert has acknowledged the failure of the aggressive Zionist regime in the region.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network; Yehuda Lucas, a professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, emphasized in an article published in the Zman Yisrael newspaper that Israel suffers from “cultural blindness” regarding the Middle East. Consequently, the major, pivotal failure Israel suffered on October 7 (during Operation Al-Aqsa Flood) completely shattered the illusion of Israeli technological superiority. However, Hamas’s success that day was not merely the result of the failure of border barriers and advanced warning systems; rather, it exposed a profound gap in our understanding of the adversary—a failure that was repeated in the case of Iran.
According to this Zionist expert, Hamas leaders—led by the (martyred) Yahya Sinwar—leveraged their repeated stints in Israeli prisons to learn Hebrew and gain a deep understanding of Israeli political psychology, media systems, and the fragile social fabric of Israeli society.
They utilized the insights gained to create a calculated strategic ambiguity for their adversary.
Elsewhere in the article, he emphasized that Israel faced no shortcomings in intelligence gathering, nor was there a lack of linguistic capability; the fundamental failure lay in the interpretation and analysis of the data, as Hamas’s plans were consistently viewed through the rigid prisms of deterrence and military superiority.
He added that this failure is not an anomaly but the culmination of a decades-long pattern of “mirror-imaging”—the erroneous assumption that the enemy operates based on the same secular Western logic and cost-benefit calculations that drive Israel’s strategic thinking.
Israel’s military and security establishment has consistently portrayed itself as possessing one of the world’s most advanced intelligence systems; from the data-gathering technological infrastructure of “Unit 8200” to the global reach of the Mossad, all these elements have fostered this (illusion) for Israel.
Yet, despite all this purported power, the system has repeatedly failed to accurately assess strategic realities. The root of the problem lies not in a lack of information, but in a structural flaw regarding the analysis and interpretation of data. Israel tends to view the Arab region through a narrow, limited lens focused exclusively on deterrence and overwhelming technological superiority—an approach that erects a conceptual wall between Tel Aviv and its surrounding environment.
As this Zionist analyst admits, this pattern of error is not a new phenomenon. On the eve of the Six-Day War, Israeli decision-makers misjudged the constraints and political motives of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the then-president of Egypt. They assessed Egyptian military movements based on the assumption that Cairo would exercise restraint, failing to grasp the strategic significance of the troop deployments and positioning.
The article further emphasizes that this flawed cognitive pattern and notorious doctrine were repeated during both the First and Second Intifadas. Israel’s military and security establishment initially dismissed these popular uprisings as mere local disturbances and transient security challenges, consistently ignoring the political depth and psychological potential that had accumulated over the years.
The article states that the strategy Israel adopted regarding Tehran also reflects a similar failure to assess reality. Israel convinced the United States that direct military action against Iran would lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic.
By framing war as a tool for regime change, Tel Aviv miscalculated Iran’s risk tolerance; based on these errors, it dragged its ally into a disastrous military adventure founded on a completely flawed premise.