Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Rivals with a Shared Fate in the Dynamics of Southern Yemen

Dynamics

PNN – Ansarullah is astutely leveraging the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the dynamics of southern Yemen.

According to the report of Pakistan News Network; recent developments on the ground in southern Yemen—beyond shifting the military balance across various fronts—have once again exposed deep rifts within the camp of Ansarullah’s adversaries.

The advance of Sana’a-aligned forces into southern and coastal regions—strengthening their position along the Bab al-Mandab axis—and the withdrawal of forces affiliated with the Aden-based government from their previous positions have occurred against a backdrop where political and military rifts between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have entered a new phase. In effect, as Ansarullah intensifies military pressure on its adversaries, the conflicting interests of the two primary actors within the Arab Coalition have made the formation of a cohesive front to counter these developments more difficult than ever.

Recent remarks by Amr al-Bidh—a special representative for Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, leader of the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—in an interview with The Guardian serve as a clear indicator of this situation. Criticizing Saudi Arabia’s policies regarding southern Yemen, al-Bidh stated that unless Riyadh recognizes the separatist demands of southern forces and facilitates the return of STC leaders to Aden, one cannot expect these forces to engage in the confrontation against Ansarullah with their full capacity. In effect, this stance constitutes a form of political and military pressure on Saudi Arabia—a strategy in which the cooperation of STC-affiliated forces on the front lines against Ansarullah is made contingent upon the acceptance of the political demands put forward by Abu Dhabi and its local allies.

The dispute between Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding the future of southern Yemen is neither a new issue nor one limited to a disagreement over how to manage military operations. Although the two countries have stood together within a joint coalition against Ansar Allah in recent years, they have not—from the very outset—pursued identical objectives concerning the political structure and the geography of power in Yemen. Riyadh continues to base its official policy in Yemen on maintaining a unified political structure and ensuring a government aligned with its own interests. In contrast, Abu Dhabi—by supporting the Southern Transitional Council and bolstering its affiliated forces—seeks to consolidate a position that could ultimately lead to the secession of the south and the establishment of an independent political entity in that part of Yemen. Consequently, the cooperation between the two nations in confronting Ansarullah has failed to resolve their conflicting interests regarding the future of Yemen.

Under these circumstances, the statements made by the representative of the Transitional Council should be viewed as more than a routine political objection. The message conveyed by this stance is that Abu Dhabi is unwilling to place the military capabilities of its proxy forces at the disposal of Saudi Arabia’s strategy without first securing the necessary political guarantees. From the Emirati perspective, countering the Ansarullah movement must not result in strengthening Riyadh’s political and military position in Yemen; rather, any cooperation in this regard must be contingent upon safeguarding the status of the Transitional Council and accepting a path toward the secession of the south. It is precisely this point that pits the interests of the two nations against each other, limiting the possibility of reaching an agreement on a unified strategy.

However, the Transitional Council’s claim that Saudi Arabia has constrained the operational capabilities of Southern forces comes at a time when, in recent months, some of the most significant and cohesive military units aligned with the UAE-led coalition—most notably the Giants Brigades (Al-Amaliqa)—have been engaged in intense combat against forces from Sana’a. Possessing substantial weaponry, organizational capacity, and logistical support, these units deployed their full strength to counter the advance of Ansarullah; yet, ultimately, they were compelled to withdraw from their positions along the coastal front.

Therefore, the issue is not merely a matter of the southern forces’ reluctance to engage in the war, or the restrictions imposed upon them by Saudi Arabia. Developments on the ground indicate that even the best-equipped units affiliated with the coalition have been unable to halt the advance of the Sana’a forces.

This withdrawal is significant because, in recent years, the Al-Amaliqa forces have served as one of the UAE’s primary military instruments for exerting influence in southern Yemen and along its western coast. The presence of these forces in areas near the Bab al-Mandab Strait was a key component of the military and political arrangements envisioned by Abu Dhabi to maintain its influence in the region. However, the advance of the Sana’a-aligned forces has not only placed the military position of their adversaries under pressure but has also challenged one of the UAE’s most critical tools for influence in these areas. This underscores the fact that possessing foreign backing and extensive military resources does not necessarily guarantee the ability to hold one’s ground on the battlefield.

On the other hand, the withdrawal of the Aden-based government’s forces from coastal areas—and the ceding of sections along the Mokha–Aden axis—carries implications that extend well beyond a mere shift in military deployment. By easing pressure on the communication routes and supply lines of the Sana’a-based forces, this move facilitates the transfer of troops and equipment toward the southern regions. Citing assessments from the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War, a report by Yemen Shabab highlights that the government forces’ withdrawal has placed over 80 kilometers of the front line between Mokha and Aden under the control of Ansarullah, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the opposition’s defensive lines. The same report identifies the fragmentation of military factions, the absence of a unified command structure, and an inability to coordinate operations as key factors that have weakened the military position of the Aden-based government.

In this context, Abu Dhabi’s conduct suggests that it views the current situation as an opportunity to exert greater pressure on Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is facing the advance of forces from Sanaa alongside the retreat of its own local allies; meanwhile, to halt these advances, it requires the cooperation of forces—a significant portion of which are backed by the UAE. Such circumstances enhance Abu Dhabi’s bargaining power, enabling it to pursue its demands regarding the future of the south with greater leverage. In effect, the more difficult Saudi Arabia’s position on the ground becomes, the higher the cost for Riyadh of disregarding the demands of the UAE and its southern allies.

However, acceding to the Transitional Council’s demands regarding the secession of the south would signify Saudi Arabia abandoning one of the core tenets of its policy in Yemen. Over the past few years, Riyadh has invested heavily in preserving a unified political structure and preventing the country’s fragmentation; it cannot easily accept the emergence of an independent entity in the south—an entity whose political and strategic ties would be largely defined by its relationship with Abu Dhabi, potentially cementing the UAE’s influence in a highly sensitive region of the Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, Saudi Arabia faces a difficult choice: it must either retreat from its long-standing stance on Yemeni unity—to retain the cooperation of the UAE and its affiliated forces—or risk an deepening rift within the coalition opposing Ansarallah.

On the other side of this equation stands Ansarallah, which has managed to leverage the internal divisions within the opposing camp—as well as the failure of their military operations—to strengthen its own position. Advances along the coastal axes, the consolidation of positions near the Bab al-Mandab, and increased pressure on the defensive lines leading to Aden carry significant political implications, extending beyond mere territorial gains. These developments demonstrate that the Arab Coalition—despite years of foreign support and access to extensive military resources—continues to face serious obstacles in achieving its objectives, and has failed to organize its affiliated forces into a coherent political and military structure.

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