PNN – The increasing and structural conflicts between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reduced the Gulf Cooperation Council to a ceremonial shell.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network, the Gulf Cooperation Council came into existence at its inception in 1981, based on a common security doctrine and as a deterrent bloc and protective shield against the expansion of Iran’s geopolitical influence in the region.
Based on the logic of defensive realism in international relations, this convergence was expected to reach its highest level in times of crisis; however, in mid-2026, in the midst of one of the most heated periods in the Middle East, which is tied to the multifaceted and widespread confrontation between Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime, this regional coalition has not only failed to achieve the expected cohesion, but is also witnessing the activation of deep intra-organizational faults.
Although previous blocs of the council, such as the Qatar blockade crisis and Oman’s balancing and independent policies, have previously challenged the unified effectiveness of the institution, the current crisis is more fundamental in nature. The strategic issue at the current juncture is the emergence of a strategic and structural divide between the core and driving force of the council, namely the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
This report shows how Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have diverged in the face of conflicting geoeconomic interests and differing perceptions of security threats, and the idea of integrated deterrence has given way to intragroup divergence and silent competition for the dominant role in the council. This strategic divide between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has effectively transformed the council’s initial architecture as a protective shield into a cracked shield.
As long as the two key actors’ readings of threat priorities do not converge and competition for the dominant role in the organization continues, the Gulf Cooperation Council will not be able to play an integrated deterrent role. Hence, potential future crises in the region will lead not to strengthening convergence, but to accelerating divergence and the emergence of parallel security orders (bilateral and transregional).
Dissecting the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi divide
The divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates cannot be reduced to a tactical disagreement in crisis management; rather, the divide is the product of strategic conflict on four fundamental axes that have shaken the foundations of their traditional alliance:
- Geoeconomic Conflict and Misaligned Development Strategies
At the heart of this divide is unprecedented geoeconomic competition. The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC was a clear symbol of the end of Abu Dhabi’s economic and energy subservience to Riyadh’s traditional policies. While the Saudi government, focusing on its “Vision 2030” megaprojects, is trying to shift the economic, trade, and investment hub of the Middle East from Dubai to Riyadh, the UAE has countered by adopting more aggressive policies in attracting foreign capital, economic liberalization, and bilateral agreements. This conflict of interests has pushed the political economy of the two countries into a competition in which any progress by Riyadh requires Abu Dhabi to retreat; a situation known in game theory as a zero-sum game.
- Divergence in Security Architecture and Proxy Wars
The Yemen issue is the most obvious point of security conflict between the two actors. While Riyadh, after years of military erosion, seeks to find a way to exit honorably, stabilize the southern borders, and systematically manage the crisis, Abu Dhabi, by supporting separatist movements in southern Yemen and dominating a network of strategic ports and islands, is focused on consolidating its maritime hegemony in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This silent geopolitical competition has effectively turned into a hidden proxy war between the two former allies, discrediting the concept of integrated deterrence of the Council.
- Heterogeneous Approaches to a Major Crisis: Post-Strike Offensive vs. Strategic Conservatism
In the context of the ongoing war between Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime, the behavioral gap between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has reached its deepest level. The United Arab Emirates, which has been the host of the most direct attacks and heavy blows to its critical infrastructure by Iran during this conflict, has turned to an offensive approach instead of a tactical retreat in a meaningful turn. Receiving hard blows and understanding the high level of asymmetric vulnerability has changed Abu Dhabi’s security doctrine from containment to active and aggressive deterrence; so that the Emirates now tries to ensure its geopolitical survival through preemptive actions and hardware confrontation.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, having carefully assessed the level of destruction in the region, has fallen into a deep state of strategic conservatism. Riyadh, which has focused its fundamental priority on maintaining the security of its capital and advancing its mega-economic projects, is trying to keep its defensive and economic ring safe from the shrapnel of war by distancing itself from the hotbeds of conflict and adopting a soft balance strategy.
- The Competition for Political Hegemony in the Arab World
The era of the UAE’s unquestioned acceptance of Saudi Arabia as the bigger brother and anchor of stability in the GCC is over. By pursuing a fully independent foreign policy, normalizing relations with Israel in the form of the Abraham Accords, and expanding its sphere of influence to the Horn of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, the UAE has shown that it wants a more prominent role in the Arab world. This approach is in direct contradiction to Saudi Arabia’s traditional claim to leadership in the Islamic world and has rendered previous blocs (such as the united coalition during the Qatar crisis) obsolete.
Conclusion
Assessing the dynamics prevailing over the past few months, it can be argued that the Gulf Cooperation Council has lost its primary function as a unified political-security bloc to contain external threats. The increasing and structural conflicts between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with Oman’s traditional neutrality and Qatar’s independent policies, have reduced the council from a powerful strategic alliance to a consultative assembly and ceremonial shell.