PNN – Expanding the blockade against Saudi Arabia beyond the Red Sea—and striking its ground positions—conveys significant messages.
According to the report of Pakistan News Network; recent developments regarding Yemen—framed by the country’s strategic calculus of “blockade for blockade” and “escalation for escalation” against Saudi Arabia—signal a qualitative shift in the rules of engagement that extends well beyond the mere blockade of Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea.
According to Al-Masirah, the equation regarding the naval blockade of Yemen has expanded beyond Saudi Arabia; it now encompasses the entire Red Sea and extends to the targeting of vessels linked to Riyadh in the Gulf of Aden. Concurrently, the past few days have witnessed swift, preemptive strikes by Yemeni armed forces against the positions of Saudi occupation troops and their mercenaries in eastern Yemen—demonstrating that all Saudi targets, whether on land or at sea, are under constant surveillance and within precise striking range.
This complex shift has created a new operational landscape wherein areas and routes intended to provide the Saudis with room for maneuver or escape have become fraught with danger, remaining under constant fire and continuous intelligence surveillance.
Meanwhile, the Saudi enemy’s options for intensifying attacks on liberated provinces—aimed at pressuring Yemeni armed forces and diverting their efforts—are also meeting with failure. This leaves the Saudi regime with only one option: to yield to the just and legitimate will of the Yemeni people.
Expansion of Yemen’s naval blockade against Saudi Arabia from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden
Regarding operations conducted by Yemeni armed forces on August 5 and 6, the Saudi oil tanker Wafa was struck by multiple ballistic missiles off the coast of Yanbu in the northern Red Sea in a precision strike. This incident occurred hours before the Saudi oil tanker Daisy was hit by a ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden. The operation successfully struck the target, damaging the vessel and forcing it to turn back.
However, this operation marks a significant expansion of the operational theater in Yemen from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, placing Saudi-linked vessels at imminent risk of being targeted.
Less than 24 hours later, Sana’a forces launched a large-scale, precision military operation targeting concentrations of Saudi-allied enemy troops in the areas of Ruwayk, Al-Abr, and Al-Thaniyah, as well as other camps belonging to the so-called 1st and 3rd Emergency Brigades affiliated with Saudi Arabia.
This operation was carried out using a large number of ballistic missiles and drones, resulting in hundreds of Saudi-allied mercenaries being killed or wounded, and the destruction and burning of numerous Saudi-held camps, troop assembly points, depots, and weapon stockpiles in the Al-Wadi’ah region of eastern Yemen. Furthermore, a significant number of military vehicles stationed at the targeted camps were destroyed.
These developments on the ground confirm that the announced “siege-for-siege” equation has evolved into a multidimensional deterrent.
Yemen’s Advanced Stage of Deterrence
The route extending from the northern Red Sea—off the coast of Yanbu—through the Gulf of Aden, and reaching the ground camps and troop assembly points at Al-Wadi’ah, Ruwayk, and Al-Abr, sends a message to the Saudi adversary: the movement of their equipment or the alteration of shipping routes grants no automatic immunity, nor does it diminish Yemen’s capacity to monitor, adapt, and strike at the opportune time and place.
These operations demonstrate that Yemen’s deterrence now relies primarily on the intelligence apparatus’s ability to track all enemy movements, as well as the armed forces’ capacity to adapt to conditions and execute rapid operations tailored to the realities of the battlefield.
Consequently, whenever Saudi Arabia seeks logistical or geographic alternatives to bypass imposed restrictions, the geographic scope of Yemen’s deterrence expands to contain and neutralize those alternatives, thereby depriving the Saudi regime of its options and maneuvering room. This turns any troop movement into a costly gamble that leads only to further losses and defeat.
Collapse of Saudi Arabia’s Maritime Escape Options
As previously noted, Yemeni armed forces recently targeted the Saudi oil tanker Wafa in the northern Red Sea, off the coast of Yanbu, using multiple ballistic missiles and scoring a precise hit.
Within hours, Yahya Saree, the spokesman for the Yemeni armed forces, announced a second operation in which the Saudi oil tanker Daisy was targeted by a ballistic missile in the Gulf of Aden. The missile struck the tanker, forcing it to retreat and turn back. This marks a significant turning point in the naval conflict.
This rapid operational shift from the northern Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden sends a decisive message: Saudi Arabia’s move away from known pressure points—such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea—does not mean escaping the reach of Yemeni retaliation and deterrence.
This expansion of the operational theater also confirms that the Saudi regime’s procrastination in addressing the legitimate demands of the Yemeni people will result in a broader scope of targeting. In practice, this will effectively impose a comprehensive naval blockade, targeting vessels linked to Saudi shipping across the entire maritime region accessible to Yemeni armed forces.
Yemeni armed forces had previously demonstrated their capability to reach the Mediterranean Sea to the east, as well as the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to the north, during the battle to support Gaza and the naval blockade against the Zionist regime.
This operational reality was quickly reflected in the assessments of international maritime intelligence centers. A report published by the British maritime intelligence firm Windward revealed the failure of the evasion strategies adopted by vessels linked to Saudi Arabia.
The report, released by the company on Friday, confirmed that rerouting Saudi-linked vessels toward the northern Red Sea to avoid the Bab al-Mandab Strait is no longer sufficient; the targeting of the oil tanker Wafa near Yanbu demonstrated that Yemen’s deterrent capability extends deep into Saudi waters, and that the Yemenis have expanded the scope of their operations beyond the previously established boundaries of the blockade.
Implications of Yemen’s Precision Strike on Saudi Positions in Eastern Yemen
Regarding the combined operation—which involved Yemeni ground-based deterrence capabilities and targeted positions held by Saudi occupation forces and their mercenaries—the most significant aspect lies in the quality and source of the prior intelligence. The statement issued by the Armed Forces explains that the operation was launched following precise intelligence monitoring of enemy troop concentrations during the final stages of preparations for a new escalation of the war.
This operation by Yemeni armed forces demonstrates the existence of an infiltrating intelligence network capable of penetrating and disrupting the enemy’s operational plans before they can be executed. It raises the cost of any future escalation by Saudi Arabia and its mercenaries, signaling that Riyadh’s logistical camps in Yemen—staffed by mercenary forces of various nationalities—will no longer be safe.
The field results of this major, high-precision operation are of immense significance, particularly given the initial admissions by media outlets affiliated with the aggressor coalition that at least 60 of their personnel—including senior commanders—were killed.
These admissions confirm that operations from Yemen were not aimed solely at thwarting Saudi Arabia’s logistical efforts but directly targeted command-and-control centers. This has caused crippling disruption to the mercenary forces upon which the Saudi enemy relies for its ground operations.
This expanding deterrence, combined with successive Yemeni ground and naval operations, has placed the Saudi regime in a costly predicament involving difficult and complex choices; should Riyadh seek to maintain a presence in nearby maritime routes, its oil shipments risk becoming targets of Yemeni attacks under a “blockade-for-blockade” equation.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s resort to longer alternative routes—such as the Cape of Good Hope—necessitates adjustments to navigation protocols and drives shipping and insurance costs to unprecedented levels.
Meanwhile, Yemen’s land-based deterrence—targeting Saudi-linked positions, including operations rooms and key assembly points—leaves the Saudis with virtually no viable options.
Ultimately, the success of Yemen’s deterrence intelligence system in linking maritime and land theaters through an integrated intelligence effort demonstrates that Saudi Arabia’s options and plans have been exposed, making them easy targets.